On October 20, 2024, parliamentary elections in the Kurdistan Region resulted in the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) winning 39 seats and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) securing 23 seats in the 100-member parliament. In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), forming a government requires a simple majority of 50% plus one vote. Following the finalization of election results, the leading party has 90 days to form a government, prompting negotiations during this period.The discussions between the KDP and PUK are expected to play a critical role in shaping the Kurdistan Region’s political future. Given this context, it is highly unlikely that the KDP would exclude the PUK from the cabinet formation. The historical and political interplay between these two parties has been a cornerstone of governance in the region. Excluding the PUK risks upsetting this delicate balance, potentially causing significant political, social, and administrative disruptions. Thus, the unique political and historical dynamics of the Kurdistan Region demand an approach centered on inclusivity and power-sharing to foster stability and ensure effective governance.
Historically, the KDP and PUK have engaged in power-sharing arrangements to form coalition governments in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Recent reports indicate that both parties are actively engaged in discussions to finalize the cabinet program for the next four years, suggesting a continuation of collaborative governance. Given this context, it is unlikely that the KDP would completely sideline the PUK in the upcoming cabinet formation. The established political tradition in the Kurdistan Region favors coalition governments, and both parties appear committed to negotiating terms for shared governance. While the KDP currently holds a stronger position with more parliamentary seats following the October 2024 elections, recent discussions suggest that the two parties are working together to finalize the cabinet program for the next four years. This indicates a preference for maintaining the cooperative approach rather than completely sidelining one another. Nevertheless, it seems that the KDP, with its stronger electoral performance, might have the leverage to push for more control over key ministerial posts or strategic areas of governance, potentially altering the traditional balance.
Previously, the KDP was able to form a government independently by using quotas, which strengthened its leverage over other parties. However, the latest election outcomes have boosted the PUK’s position. The KDP’s main priority now is to quickly establish a government after two years of dysfunction. In the past, government formation discussions between the two parties lasted 10 months in 2018 and nine months in 2013. Probably, current negotiations might face delays due to the upcoming Iraqi parliamentary elections, as the role of Iraqi president could become a negotiation point between the KDP and PUK. Any delay risks further undermining the legitimacy of the current provisional government, but past events suggest that the Kurdish leadership duo will explore all possible arrangements to advance their interests.
Currently, despite securing three minority seats held by its Christian and Turkmen allies, the KDP still lacks enough seats to reach a majority and will need to collaborate with another party to secure legislative backing. While the New Generation Movement—a populist opposition group with fifteen seats—could provide the necessary majority in coalition with the KDP, its platform is centered on removing both the KDP and PUK from power. The New Generation leaders are keenly aware that their supporters would desert them end masse if they joined the government, having witnessed the Gorran Movement face a similar backlash. Other parties in the parliament, including two Islamist groups and various smaller secular factions, have little interest in joining the next government and lack sufficient seats to make negotiations with the KDP worthwhile. Consequently, the KDP is left with no option but to negotiate with the PUK. Realistically, even if the seat counts theoretically allowed for a coalition with smaller parties, such an arrangement is highly improbable due to the entrenched territorial divides within the Kurdistan Region.
The PUK’s conditions for forming a government in the Kurdistan Region revolve around achieving an equitable distribution of power, influence over key decisions, and ensuring its policy priorities are represented within the coalition framework. In the past, PUK’s involvement often hinged on reaching an agreement with the KDP or other parties about the distribution of power, including key ministerial positions, administrative roles, and influence in security political institutions within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).But in this cabinet the PUK looking for balance of Influence. Historically, the PUK and KDP have shared power based on a geographic and administrative division of influence, with strongholds in different regions of Kurdistan (PUK in Sulaymaniyah and parts of Kirkuk, for example). But in this upcoming cabinet PUK’s priority is to ensuring a balance of influence which would be critical for any coalition agreement. It could be argued that the PUK’s internal unity and the influence of its leadership on the party’s decisions can also impact its PUK’s position for forming a government, as unity within the party could give credit to the party’s position or demands.
Moreover, the PUK leader Bafel Talabani addressed supporters, emphasizing promises which generally reflect equitable governance, and the failures of the current cabinet, including their inability to provide essential services, create jobs, and eliminate discrimination between yellow and green zones. As can be expected, the government formation will be a lengthy and rocky process, breaking Kurdistan’s own protracted record. Recent developments show that key differences between PUK and PDK parties have been deepened along with the current cabinet under the prime minister’s leadership Masrur Barzani. Unlike previous eras, for the PUK this stage would be more important to think strategically in negotiation with PDK, meaning that unlike the past elections, it could be argued that it’s not important for the PUK to take important ministries and positions of the government; rather voters expect more from PUK leaders. For more than a decade now, there has been a widening gap between citizens and the political class and KRG, constituting a strategic problem for peace and stability in Kurdistan, particularly as PUK leaders always stress the marginalizing of Sulaymaniyah -Green Zone-.
Bafel Talabani in the election campaigns succeeded in bringing some change, and gave hope for young people which made the PUK over very decisive momentum. After a decade of stagnation and a cost-of-living crisis, this is the right course. The new government must enable the conditions for building a service centric government. That will mean higher public investment in infrastructure and public services, job creation, ending discrimination between geographic areas. Lessons from the past showed that we are at a perilous moment for PUK promises before the election. PUK first steps must be to restore faith in government by delivering tangible improvements to living standards, and fast.
Although both parties have faced significant tensions in recent years, especially concerning power-sharing and legislative disagreements, they recognize that cooperation is essential to maintain a functional KRG. The two parties have expressed willingness to negotiate, albeit with underlying friction. The KDP is in a position to lead cabinet formation but will likely need to include the PUK to achieve a broad-based government that can function effectively within the divided political landscape. Additionally, a unified KRG cabinet is crucial to counter external pressures from Baghdad and Iran, which have leveraged internal Kurdish divisions to increase their influence in the region. A government arrangement that excludes either of the ruling parties could disrupt government operations in both the Yellow and Green Zones, potentially weakening the already fragile dual structure. In such a scenario, the PUK—leveraging its alignment with Baghdad- and Tehran-centered policies—might also more forcefully assert its demands for autonomy from Erbil.
– This article represents the author’s own views.
