The Islamic Republic of Iran is the only strategic ally of the Baath regime and Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Their relationship dates back to the early years of the Iranian Revolution, particularly during the Iran-Iraq War. At that time, Hafez al-Assad’s government was one of the few countries supporting Iran against Saddam Hussein.
Since then, the relationship between the two sides has grown closer and more complex. Iran views Syria as a crucial member of the “Axis of Resistance,” considering the country’s territory a vital corridor connecting Iran and Iraq to Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. Strategically, Syria is indispensable to Iran’s regional aspirations. For Iran, Syria is also a key part of its ideological competition in the Middle East, often described as part of the “Shiite Crescent,” despite the fact that the majority of Syrians are Sunni Muslims.
Yet, as Bashar al-Assad fled Syria hours ago and opposition forces took control of Damascus, one pressing question emerges: why couldn’t Iran save Assad this time, even as it did back in 2012?
A Look Back: The Arab Spring and Iran’s Intervention
To answer this, we must revisit the events of the Arab Spring in Syria beginning in 2011. When the wave of Arab Spring protests reached Syria in late 2011, Bashar al-Assad faced immense pressure. By 2012, Iran, at Assad’s request, intervened directly and managed to save his collapsing regime from opposition forces. This situation continued until 2015.
Russia Enters the Scene
As Assad’s opposition grew stronger and new regional and international players entered the Syrian civil war, Iran faced increasing pressure. It became evident that Iran alone could not bear the burden, especially as it faced severe sanctions from the Obama administration over its nuclear program. This prompted Iranian officials, led by General Qassem Soleimani, to pave the way for Russia’s intervention in Syria.
In 2015, Russia entered the Middle East and Syria for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union. At a time when the Obama administration—and later the Trump administration—showed little interest in overthrowing Assad, Russia’s presence shifted the balance in Assad’s favor.
This development caused Turkey to pull back, and over time, the Arab world also began to accept Assad’s regime. However, about 40% of Syrian territory remained outside the control of the central government.
A Sudden Shift in Syria’s Dynamics
After six years of relative stagnation on various fronts, the situation in Syria suddenly changed. While the world focused on the war between Israel and Hamas, followed by a ceasefire, and awaited a shift in power with Donald Trump’s anticipated return to the White House, the dynamics in Syria dramatically shifted.
Within two weeks, Turkish-backed Islamist and Arab forces from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham achieved significant breakthroughs in Syria. Much like the Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan in 2020, these groups combined military strength with behind-the-scenes diplomatic agreements, leading to Assad’s forces retreating to the capital with minimal clashes. They then took control of Damascus in a similar fashion.
Assad’s soldiers, reportedly earning a meager monthly salary of $30, lacked the motivation to defend his regime. Simultaneously, Russia’s military and logistical capabilities in Syria diminished significantly due to its involvement in Ukraine, while Iran’s forces faced extensive Israeli airstrikes across Syria.
As Assad’s forces retreated, Russia’s support dwindled. Speculation about a secret deal between Russia, Turkey, and Assad’s opposition circulated in media and diplomatic circles. The new rulers of Syria reportedly agreed to honor previous agreements with Russia, including the lease of the Tartus naval base until 2040, among other bilateral arrangements. This left Iran as Assad’s sole remaining field ally.
Did Iran Lack the Capacity to Save Assad?
As in 2015, when Iran had to bring Russia into the conflict to shift the tide, it lacked the capacity to change the course of events this time. Domestically, Iran is grappling with severe economic challenges. Regionally, it has been directly confronting Israel, and its two key allies—Hezbollah and Hamas—have been significantly weakened. Consequently, Hezbollah could not intervene in Syria as it had in the past to support Assad.
Additionally, Iraq’s government and its Shiite factions, including Moqtada al-Sadr, showed no willingness to get involved in Syria, further isolating Iran. Under these circumstances, Iran naturally could not unilaterally support Assad and save his regime once again. This may explain why Iranian forces, like the Russians, refrained from significant moves in Syria, and even Iran’s official media softened its tone. Assad’s opponents were no longer labeled as “takfiris” or “terrorists” but were instead called “armed opposition forces.”
All these factors converged to make Bashar al-Assad the latest Middle Eastern dictator to fall. His fall will undoubtedly have profound consequences for the Syrian people and the region. One of the most significant outcomes is the reduction of Iran’s regional power and influence, particularly in the Levant and Palestine.
