Asst. Prof. Dr. Amin Faraj Sharif | University Professor and Director of the Center for Political and Strategic Research
M.A. Tahseen Waso Abdullah | Researcher and University Tutor

The modern Iranian state was established after 1925 under the Pahlavis, who were the last royal dynasty to come to power after the Qajars, ruling Iran from 1925 to 1979. Throughout the Pahlavi period (1925-1979), the state’s strategy and policy were built upon the foundation of dissolving the Kurds as a nation at the domestic level within Iran. At the regional level, the state’s perspective toward the Kurds in other parts was manifested in the development of military and security cooperation with those states over which Kurdish territory was divided, with the aim of containing and weakening, or eliminating, the Kurdish liberation movement. After the collapse of the Shah’s regime and the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979), this policy continued. Despite Iran’s disagreements with the states over which Kurdish territory was divided (Turkey, Iraq, and Syria) on a number of issues, what has always brought Iran together with these states at the negotiating table has been the Kurdish question—this is true not only for the past but also for the present. In this regard, Iran’s perspective toward the establishment of political authority (1991) and the example of the Kurdistan Region’s referendum in September 2017 are living examples. Within the framework of this analytical research, emphasis has been placed on two main topics: first, presenting the emergence of state identity in Iran; second, Iran’s perspective and policy toward the Kurdistan Region. These subjects are presented in detail below.

First: The Foundation and Framework of Iranian State Identity

From a historical perspective, generally speaking, the process of forming Iranian state identity is divided into two stages: the pre-Islamic stage and the post-Islamic stage. According to these two stages, both identities have become the cause of the emergence of Iranian identity. In other words, the contemporary identity of the Iranian state fundamentally has two important pillars: the perspective and vision of Shi’a Islamic sectarianism, and the culture and civilization of pre-Islamic empires¹. As the Persian researcher Ervand Abrahamian has determined, Iranians define themselves both with Shi’a Islamic sectarian affiliation and within the framework of pre-Islamic culture, particularly with Sasanian, Achaemenid, and Parthian cultures². In determining state identity, Persian has been established as a dominant racial-ethnic form, which in one way or another has manifested the dominance and supremacy of Persians as a nation over other nations³.

Regarding state identity in Iran, before anything else, it is necessary to provide a historical background of the state, because one of the fundamental bases of state identity is directly related to the past of that state. Within the Iranian framework, when evaluating national identity as an ideological and philosophical foundation of the state, it goes back to the period of the establishment of the Safavid Empire (1501), which continues until the 1920s. During Reza Pahlavi’s era (1925-1941), a conscious and largely unified national identity was supported by the national sovereignty and “common memory” of the Persian Empire. This history of the Persian Empire, along with its ideology, became the fundamental basis of state identity⁴.

When Reza Shah came to power in 1925, he worked intensively to create a state based on the concept of nation (nation-state) and to give the state a Western appearance. To this end, he worked to unify fragmented identities within the framework of a general identity that would represent Iranian nationality. Reza Shah employed various instruments to establish his ideas and principles, such as military, cultural, and educational instruments⁵.

Reza Shah’s policies within the framework of Iran’s modernization process were manifested in several directions, including⁶:

• Establishing conscription laws and reorganizing the judiciary system
• Forcibly changing clothing style to the European style
• Prohibiting the hijab
• Confronting the role of religious figures in society and limiting their activities
• Creating various educational organizations in the European style
• Changing the calendar from the Hijri to the Iranian calendar

Reza Shah was heavily influenced by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his policies of “one state, one nation, one language,” attempting to strengthen central authority more than before and ensure that all inhabitants of Iran had only one identity. For this reason, in 1935, Reza Shah changed the name of the country from Persia to Iran, as a source for all different nations. In the new Iran, all laws that were in the interest of the regions were abandoned, and the country was built on a Persian-centered foundation, and regional authorities, however minimal they were, disappeared. The Pahlavi dynasty, until their fall, continued their efforts to dissolve all nations within one identity called Iranian-Persian, all of which were in the interest of the Persian nation⁷. Despite the fact that this issue historically dates back to before Reza Shah’s time, the prominent Iranian writer Seyyed Javad Tabatabai (1945-2023) traces Iranian culture back nearly 2,000 years⁸. At this stage, the composition of state identity in Iran derived from three main elements: religious/Islamic element, ethnic element, and secularism. These three elements constituted the foundation of the state’s general policy⁹.

After the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979, political Islam replaced modernity, and the Shi’a sect became, officially and more extensively than before, a powerful factor in national identity in Iran. The constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran designated Twelver Shi’a Islam as the official religion of the country, and even the official policy of the state and state actors was based on the thesis of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist) and the foundation of Twelver Shi’ism. This policy has resulted in other religious groups and sects such as Sunnis, Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians being marginalized and deprived of most civil rights, despite the fact that in the constitution of the Islamic Republic, Zoroastrian, Christian, and Jewish religions are recognized, but the Baha’i faith is not mentioned. This has resulted in Baha’is being deprived of all legal and universal rights¹⁰.

The state identity of Iran after the Islamic Republic Revolution was not built on the basis of rejecting the state identity from Reza Shah’s era; rather, the Islamic Revolution built state identity in such a way that it was a mixture of national-sectarian identity (Persian-Shi’ism). Revolutionary religious ideology is a constituent component of internal composition and external stances of Iran, such as the opposition of a Shi’a religious figure (Ayatollah Khomeini, 1902-1989) to Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, which began. In reality, Khomeini placed great importance on “anti-imperialist” discourses and advocated that throughout Iran’s history, they have always confronted the political, cultural, and economic invasion of Western powers, which, in Khomeini’s view, the Pahlavis attempted to destroy. Considering history, it can be said that the ideology of Shi’ism/sectarianism is more important for Iranian national identity than religious ideology¹¹.

State identity in Iran derives from three main factors: Islamic culture and the Shi’a sect, revolutionary sectarian ideology, and Iranian history and culture (particularly Shi’a culture). These three factors, as the foundation and main composition of state identity after the Islamic Revolution (1979), have been the basis of Iran’s policy and behavior both at the level of domestic policy and foreign policy. That is, the state has organized its direction and behavior toward events and developments based on these three factors, and state identity is built upon these three factors; furthermore, the state has found its legitimacy as a political system within the framework of these three factors¹².

The fundamental basis of Iran’s constitution is republican, based on the model of democracy, the historical will of the Iranian people, and Islamism. However, the constitutional republicanism of the state in Iran differs from the understanding that is prevalent and used in Western political and legal literature¹³. The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, in the first announcement of the state’s political charter, emphasized that standing against the government/state is standing against God’s sovereignty¹⁴. This perspective toward the state manifests itself in sanctification, whose purpose was to eliminate all opposition forces and dissenting voices against the Islamic Republic system.

According to the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in terms of hierarchy, a kind of inequality is observed, which is stated in Article 2 of the constitution: “The Islamic Republic of Iran is a system based on belief in the one God, divine revelation and its fundamental role in all laws, the Imamate, etc.”¹⁵ According to this article, the separation of religion from politics is completely rejected, and all types of policy derive from religion/Shi’a sectarian Islam, or Shi’a jurisprudence. In other words, this article considers Shi’a citizenship as first class, and those who do not belong to the Shi’a sect come in other classes.

Article 4 of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran stipulates that all civil, financial, economic, penal, cultural, administrative, military, and political laws and regulations are connected to the religion of Islam and must not be outside the religion of Islam. These duties are assigned to the Guardian Council, which consists of several high-ranking Shi’a figures and is appointed by the decision and command of the Leader of the Islamic Republic¹⁶.

Article 12 also recognizes Islam and the official sect of Ja’fari Twelver Shi’ism as the official religion of the state¹⁷. Article 15 is dedicated to the official language of the state and states: “The official and common language and script of the Iranian people is Persian. Documents, correspondence, official texts, and textbooks must be in this language and script, but the use of local and ethnic languages in the press and public media and teaching their literature in schools is free, alongside the Persian language”¹⁸.

Furthermore, Shi’a Islam is an important component that supports Iranian national identity, and after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the definition of being Iranian became a common belief, as well as a broader and stronger common culture and history. In reality, the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based on a kind of cultural hegemony as well as Iranian nationalism. It can be said that the effect of unifying religion as a mechanism for protecting the state and dominating fragmented identities and framing them to serve the general identity of the state.

Second: Iraqi Kurds/Kurdistan Region within the Framework of the Iranian State’s Perspective

Iran, as a regional state over which part of Kurdish territory is divided, has continuously dealt with sensitivity toward events and changes in other parts of Kurdistan, particularly Southern Kurdistan/Iraqi Kurdistan. Tehran, ever since the establishment of Iraq (1921) and the attachment of Mosul Province to Iraq, has believed that Southern Kurdistan, from a security and identity perspective, affects the Kurds of Iran; within this framework, the Iranian state’s perspective toward Southern Kurdistan has been determined. At the same time, Southern Kurdistan has been both a point of disagreement and a point of agreement between Tehran and Baghdad as a main issue. In other words, the Kurdistan Region has always been seen as an important factor in Iran-Iraq relations. Sometimes it has been a factor of agreement between Tehran and Baghdad, but at other times it has been a factor of disagreement. The Kurdistan Region, as a political authority, came into existence after 1992; Iran, as a neighboring state, had great concerns about this Kurdish experiment and believed it would have a direct impact on other parts of Kurdistan. This suspicious perspective toward the Kurdistan Region has continued to be a main factor in Iran dealing with the Kurdistan Region within the framework of a security issue. Although the weakening of the Iraqi state (after the Second Gulf War/the war to expel the Iraqi army from Kuwait in 1990) and then the collapse of the Ba’ath regime in 2003 were seen as a common point between the Kurdistan Region and Iran, nevertheless, Iran’s perspective toward the Kurdistan Region remained within the framework of a security perspective and believed that the greatest threat to Tehran’s security and interests originated from the Kurdistan Region. In this section, Iran’s perspective toward the Kurdistan Region is examined within the framework of dividing three historical stages: the first stage is dedicated to presenting and understanding Iran’s perspective toward the Kurdistan Region before the establishment of political authority, meaning from after the establishment of the Iraqi state until 1992. In the second stage, Iran’s perspective toward the Kurdistan Region from 1992-2005 is presented. In the third stage (after 2005), Iran’s perspective toward the Kurdistan Region is discussed. The stages are detailed below.

1. Iraqi Kurds in Iran’s Policy and Strategy (1921-1992)

Iran’s perspective toward Iraqi Kurds has been manifested under the influence of policy and strategy toward Iraq. From the day the Iraqi state was established under British mandate after World War I, the Kurds emerged as a new problem between Iran and Iraq. The old problem, which continued in a new form and under a new state, became one of the most prominent factors that affected Iran-Iraq relations¹⁹. Iranian nationalist thinker Mohammad Ali Foroughi emphasizes that Kurds have a distinct identity; this identity difference creates negative effects not only on the Iranian nation-building process but is also dangerous for Turkish and Iraqi nation-building. To prevent this danger, the Iranian state must cooperate with Turkey and Iraq to prevent the idea of an independent Kurdistan from developing²⁰.

After Iraq was established by the British, Iran believed that this state had its eye on the Shatt al-Arab and Khuzestan regions that were under Iranian authority. This confronted the two countries several times, which caused Iran not to formally recognize Iraq until 1929, at a time when the Iraqi government supported the “Arab state” in the Khuzestan region of Iran; in return, Iran supported the Kurdish uprising led by Sheikh Mahmud Barzinji (1878-1956), which continued from 1910 to 1923²¹.

After the changes of July 14, 1958, monarchical authority in Iraq collapsed and a republican system was established. Thus, Iraq’s domestic and foreign policy underwent fundamental changes. A short time after Abdul Karim Qasim (1914-1963) came to power, he announced that the Sa’dabad Pact (1937), which determined the border between Iraq and Iran, would be abolished. The Iranian state saw this as an opportunity to support the Kurds through financial assistance and weapons and use them against the Iraqi state. Simultaneously, Western states, particularly America, as well as Israel, supported the Shah of Iran’s policy to weaken the Iraqi state²². When the armed revolution of the Kurdish liberation movement began on September 11, 1961, against the Iraqi state, Iran was pleased; in the media apparatus, special importance was given to Kurdish activities against the Iraqi government. The Kurdish liberation movement, with Iran’s assistance, dealt a deadly blow to the Iraqi government, particularly in 1969, when for several days it halted oil exports from the Kirkuk oil company. This caused the Iraqi state to accuse Iran of interfering in internal affairs²³.

After the leadership of the Kurdish liberation movement reached an agreement with the Iraqi government in March 1970, one of the main factors of the agreement was directly related to Iran’s cooperation and assistance to the Kurdish liberation movement against Iraq, because the Kurds, through Iran’s assistance, had been able to withstand the attacks of the Iraqi government²⁴. However, two years after signing the agreement, problems began between the Iraqi government and Kurdish leadership, which caused the Kurdish armed movement to once again confront the government. This situation was favorable for Iran to once again assist the Kurds against the Iraqi government, because the Shah was very concerned about the March 1970 agreement and Iraq’s treaty with the Soviet Union. This situation deepened the disagreements between Iraq and Iran. In a letter in 1972, the Shah of Iran sent to the leader of the Kurdish liberation movement (Mustafa Barzani), indicating that with the consent of the United States of America, he had sent assistance to the Kurdish revolution. Thus, the Kurds’ relationship with America was established through Iran. After the re-establishment of relations between the Kurds and Iran and the failure of negotiations and dialogue between the Iraqi government and the political leadership of the Kurdish liberation movement, clashes and fighting resumed between the two sides²⁵. As a result of Iran’s assistance, the Kurdish liberation movement put the Iraqi state under great pressure, to the point that Iraq sent a delegation to Iran for dialogue. Iraq showed willingness to grant any concessions in return for stopping assistance to Iraqi Kurds. Thus, the Shah’s regime’s assistance to the Kurdish liberation movement in Iraq continued until the Algiers Agreement (March 6, 1975). One of the clauses of this agreement was that the Shah must stop his assistance to Iraqi Kurds, which was a deadly blow to the Kurdish liberation movement in Iraq²⁶.

In 1979, a new situation arose at the domestic level of both states: the success of Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979; in Iraq, Saddam Hussein removed Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr from power through a white coup and took his place. This change created negative effects on the relations of both states. This new situation caused the Kurdish movement in Iraq to place hope on the new authority in Iran. Therefore, the leadership of the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) asked the leaders of Iran’s Islamic Revolution to abolish the Algiers Agreement. Although Iran did not officially abolish this agreement, it set aside its clauses and once again began its assistance to the Kurdish liberation movement in Iraq²⁷. However, the Iraqi government officially announced in 1982 that it had abolished the Algiers Agreement. Thus, in the eight-year Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), the Kurds were on Iran’s side against Iraq.

Therefore, Iran’s perspective in this stage toward Iraqi Kurds was depicted within the framework of policy and relations with Iraq, meaning that whenever Iran-Iraq relations were normal, the Kurds were seen by Iran as a threat; whenever Iran-Iraq relations were in crisis, the Kurds were used as a pressure card and political tool against Iraq, in such a way that Iran’s assistance to Iraqi Kurds was for the purpose of weakening the Iraqi state. From this perspective, Iran’s view of Iraqi Kurds was seen as a tool to be used against Iraq, not as a strategic perspective or shared vision.

2. The Kurdistan Region in the Formation of Autonomous Authority and Iran’s Position and Perspective (1992-2005)

After the expulsion of Ba’ath regime forces from Kuwait (February 1991) and the great defeat of the Iraqi army, a new situation arose. This new situation was helpful for people in the central and southern regions of Iraq to begin uprisings against the Ba’ath regime. Simultaneously, the people of the Kurdistan Region also began the uprising (1991) against the Iraqi government. This situation was a source of happiness for Iran because it would lead to the weakening of an enemy and staunch adversary, which was the Iraqi state. However, after a short time, the Iraqi government began suppressing the uprisings in the southern and central regions of Iraq. This created great fear among the people of the Kurdistan Region, so in the Kurdistan Region, people massively turned toward the borders of Iran and Turkey, and a migration of millions began. From Iran’s perspective, this migration was not seen as a positive event; rather, Tehran was afraid that this large number of people would create economic and social, even political and security, effects on the domestic situation. Therefore, Iran wanted this process to be stopped and a limit set for Saddam Hussein’s regime’s aggressions.

Iran, through its representative at the United Nations, on April 4, 1991, sent a memorandum to the Security Council requesting action to take necessary measures to stop the wave of Kurdistan Region people’s migration to the borders. As a result of Iran, Turkey, and France’s memorandum, with the cooperation of Britain and America, Security Council Resolution 688 was issued. The resolution indicated that this migration of Kurdistan Region people would pose a threat to regional and international security²⁸. Iran believed that the displacement of this large number of Kurdistan Region people created great economic difficulties for the government, aside from security and social effects. However, Iran at a high level provided good reception to the refugees, and state institutions dealt with the issue as a humanitarian situation²⁹. Thus, under the light of international Security Council Resolution 688, the No-Fly Zone came into existence. In May 1992, general elections were conducted; based on these elections, the Kurdistan Region parliament and government were established, and autonomous authority was founded in the Kurdistan Region.

From Iran’s perspective, for the Kurds, the subject of being Kurdish as a distinct nation and nation-building as a national project were two issues imposed by the West to create danger and threat to the security and identity of those states over which Kurdish territory was divided³⁰. The establishment of political/autonomous authority in the Kurdistan Region was a source of concern for Tehran. Therefore, it expressed its concern about the presence of coalition forces. Iran’s then Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati (1982-1997) frankly announced that what exists in northern Iraq is a problem for neighboring states, particularly Iran, because there the Iraqi army has no presence³¹. This caused Iran to view the Kurdistan Region with suspicion. This suspicious perspective of Iran originated from the fact that this event would affect the territorial integrity of Iraq; at the same time, it would lay the groundwork for the establishment of a Kurdish state. In this regard, Iran’s then Foreign Minister announced that Iran opposes the division of Iraq’s territorial integrity and the establishment of a Kurdish entity, and will use all instruments to prevent those steps by the Kurdistan Region that would lead toward establishing an independent entity³². Iran, similar to other neighboring states, was ready to cooperate with each other to prevent the Kurdistan Region’s progress. For this purpose, at the level of foreign ministries, Turkey, Iran, and Syria held a special meeting on November 14 and 25, 1992, in Ankara, Turkey’s capital, on how to deal with events in the Kurdistan Region³³.

Regarding Iran’s position toward the experience of autonomous authority in the Kurdistan Region, Turkey’s then president, Turgut Özal, announced: “Iran is the greatest obstacle to the establishment of the Kurdistan Region government; because of Iran’s fear, it creates many obstacles to this government”³⁴. Tehran believed that any event in the region would also affect the Kurds in other parts of Kurdistan and feared that this experience of the Kurdistan Region would become a model for Iran’s Kurds³⁵. However, when political authority came into existence and the Kurdistan Region’s situation became de facto, although Iran did not recognize the Kurdistan Region government and was not ready to formally establish relations with the Kurdistan Region government, its relations continued through political parties³⁶.

At this stage, Iran’s foreign policy objectives toward the Kurdistan Region were manifested in several points, including³⁷:

• Protecting borders
• Confronting and preventing the activities of Iranian Kurdish opposition forces residing in the Kurdistan Region
• Establishing relations with political parties in the Kurdistan Region
• Concern about the hegemony of Western states and Turkey in the Kurdistan Region
• Working with Turkey and Syria regarding their unified position toward the Kurdistan Region

Turkish researcher Bayram Sinkaya believes that Iran’s fear of the formation of Kurdistan Region autonomous authority originated from several points, including: Iran’s fear of Turkey’s rising hegemony in the region, particularly in the oil and energy sector, which would make the balance of power in Turkey’s favor; also, through the Kurdistan Region, Iranian Kurdish opposition forces (Kurdish political parties in Iran) pose a threat to the state’s security. However, after the establishment of political authority in the Kurdistan Region, Iran, to reduce those negative effects on its security and interests, attempted to obtain guarantees from Kurdistan Region authorities that Kurdish political parties would not become a threat to Iran’s security through the Kurdistan Region. Also, Tehran opened special offices for Kurdistan Region political parties, particularly (KDP and PUK), in Tehran and other Iranian cities. Iran in this stage, through establishing military institutions affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards, monitored events and developments in the Kurdistan Region to ensure that this experience would not become a threat to Tehran’s security and interests³⁸. For this purpose, Tehran opened its representative office in the Kurdistan Region, initially opening it in Diana (Diana headquarters), then to develop commercial, political, and military relations, the representation was moved to Erbil under the name “Erbil Office for Iran’s Relations,” then it also opened its offices at the level of other cities³⁹.

When the Kurdistan parliament issued the decision to declare federalism, Resolution No. 22, on October 4, 1992, it was a step from autonomous authority/autonomy to a region within the framework of a federal state (a democratic and united Iraq)⁴⁰. Iran was concerned about this decision by the Kurdistan Region and believed it was a great threat to its national interests. To create an obstacle to this step by the Kurdistan Region, it changed the direction of its policy and began opposing the Kurdistan Region, because Iran believed that the success of this experience was a threat to internal integrity and security. Therefore, it put all its efforts into the failure of this experience, either through pressure on political parties and creating divisions between the main sides of the political process, or through coordination and cooperation with neighboring countries, particularly Turkey. Although the political authority in the Kurdistan Region had announced to Iran that they would not pose a threat to their interests and security and wanted to advance political and economic relations with Tehran, Iran was not ready to deal with the Kurdistan Region as an official entity; rather, its relations were through political parties⁴¹.

In the early stage of the establishment of the Kurdistan Region parliament and government, relations with Iran, compared to the Turkish state, were weak, which was related to the fact that at this stage, the Kurdistan Region politically, economically, and humanly relied on the assistance of Western states and Turkey. However, after the Kurdistan Region moved toward the stage of internal war (1994-1997), Tehran, through military and intelligence institutions, fully inserted itself into the Kurdistan Region to monitor opposition forces’ activities and Iraq’s situation and dominate the situation that had developed in the Kurdistan Region⁴². At this stage, the Kurdistan Region was both a threat and an opportunity for Iran. Meaning that Tehran, on one hand, believed that through the Kurdistan Region it could expand into other regions of Iraq; on the other hand, Iran feared that the Kurdistan Region’s experience would be transferred as a model to other parts of Kurdistan, including Iran’s Kurds, who would directly or indirectly fall under the effects of this Kurdistan Region experience⁴³.

The collapse of the Ba’ath regime in 2003 was a positive common point for the Kurdistan Region and Iran, because both saw Saddam’s regime as an enemy. On the other hand, Tehran had predicted from the beginning that Shi’as constitute the majority of Iraq’s population and would become the most influential component in rebuilding new Iraq. Also, Iraq’s changes were in the Kurdistan Region’s interest. Iran in the stage before the invasion of Iraq had begun implementing a realistic policy toward the Kurdistan Region because it predicted that the Kurds would have an important role in Iraq’s future. Within that framework, Jalal Talabani, President of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, visited Tehran in January 2003. In this visit, Iranian officials promised to continue supporting the Kurdistan Region in the event of changes in the Iraqi system⁴⁴.

At this stage (establishment of autonomous authority 1992-2005), Iran’s perspective toward the Kurdistan Region within the framework of threats and opportunities was manifested in several points, including: Tehran was initially a helpful factor for establishing the No-Fly Zone, but when, under the shadow of international factor, the Kurdistan Region institutionally and politically advanced, manifesting itself in establishing political autonomous authority, Tehran was not ready to recognize it. Tehran, instead of establishing formal relations with the political authority in the Kurdistan Region, established relations with political parties separately on the basis of maintaining the balance of protecting interests. Also, at this stage, Tehran saw another factor as a threat regarding the Kurdistan Region related to two points: first, the presence of Western states in the Kurdistan Region, which in the long term strategically harms its interests; second, related to the fact that Tehran fears this experience will affect Iran’s Kurds and incite them against the authority and create a threat to Iran’s internal security. Another issue at this stage that attracted Tehran’s attention was Iraq’s future, which at the end of this stage (2003) underwent fundamental changes at the level of the entire state. Therefore, these several factors at this stage constituted the fundamental basis of Tehran’s perspective toward the Kurdistan Region.

3. The Transformation of the Kurdistan Region in Iran’s Perspective (After 2005)

Iran, after 2003, has dealt with the Kurdistan Region within the framework of the Iraqi state. Meaning that the Kurdistan Region has not been defined as a separate character from Iraq; rather, it has been seen as part of Iraq. Because after the end of the Ba’ath regime, Iraqi territorial unity emerged as an unchanging strategy; any change that threatens Iraqi territorial unity, Iran has strongly opposed⁴⁵. From this perspective, the Kurdistan Region’s desire and wish for federal government directly serves Iran’s strategy and policy in Iraq. However, Iran was afraid of the style of state management system that according to the constitution (2005) was federal, because it believed this would in the future create direct danger to Tehran’s hegemony and influence and put Iraq’s territorial unity at risk. This perspective of Tehran toward granting authority to the Kurdistan Region caused it to prevent the implementation of the federal system in Iraq through supporting those sides that believe in reducing the Kurdistan Region’s authority, particularly after conducting the Kurdistan Region referendum⁴⁶.

Iran, in 2005, opened its consulates in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah and believes that the importance of the Kurdistan Region is no less than the importance of other cities in central and southern Iraq for Iran; indeed, in terms of geopolitical strategy, the importance of the Kurdistan Region may be greater than other regions of Iraq from the perspective of the Iranian state’s interests⁴⁷.

When the issue of independence was raised by the political leadership of the Kurdistan Region, Iran openly expressed its concern and emphasized that this issue creates negative effects on Iran due to the emergence of a new balance in the region and the rise of the role and position of Kurds in general and the Kurdistan Region in particular, creating direct threats to Tehran’s interests. Meaning that the strengthening of the Kurdistan Region becomes a model for Kurds in Iran. To prevent this step, it has followed two types煮 of strategies: first, attempting to create internal problems in the Kurdistan Region, putting pressure on the Region from Baghdad, and creating security threats on the borders under the pretext of protecting its security. Second, working to disrupt the unified Kurdish discourse and deepening problems, particularly on those issues where parties and political sides disagree⁴⁸.

Tehran has seen the advancement of the Kurdistan Region’s political, economic, and energy relations with Turkey and Western states as a threat because it believed that these steps by the Kurdistan Region create danger to national security and interests. Therefore, through the Iraqi government, it has attempted to create obstacles to the Kurdistan Region. From Iran’s perspective, the subject of independence and a Kurdish state is the greatest threat to Iraq’s territorial integrity. Therefore, by all means, it has prevented the Kurdistan Region’s independence and the establishment of a Kurdish state⁴⁹.

Iran, to prevent the Kurdistan Region’s discourse and steps toward independence, uses both internal and external instruments. At the domestic level of the Kurdistan Region, it uses disagreements between sides as a political instrument and pressure card. From this perspective, Tehran specifically and deliberately supports some sides against other sides; those parties and sides that Tehran supports deal with events and developments according to Iran’s interests. In this regard, Tehran continuously announced its opposition to KDP policies and accused it of putting Iraq’s territorial unity at risk; at the same time, on internal issues, sides that disagreed with the party, for example on the issue of Kurdistan Region presidency, conducting the referendum, and managing relations between Erbil and Baghdad, their positions aligned with Iran. In other words, Tehran uses those parties and sides from the perspective of its national security interests to achieve its political goals⁵⁰.

After the success of Kurdistan Peshmerga forces over ISIS, with the assistance of coalition forces and Iran, the Kurdistan Region’s position at the Iraqi, regional, and international levels was strengthened. The strengthening of this position caused Peshmerga forces to be able to retake all disputed areas/areas outside the Kurdistan Region administration. This caused relations between the Region government and the Iraqi federal government to move toward greater complexity, particularly during the second term of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki (2010-2014), to the point that relations reached the level of rupture and threatening through the use of force against the Kurdistan Region. Iran’s position was to support the Iraqi government’s policy in controlling those areas that, as a result of ISIS attacks, were de facto able to be placed under the Kurdistan Region. Sometimes Iran’s policy was directed toward mediation between the Region government and the federal Baghdad government, but at the same time, Tehran supported the federal government authority so that those areas would be under Baghdad’s authority, not the Kurdistan Region⁵¹.

Therefore, the framework of the general lines of Iran’s perspective toward the Kurdistan Region consisted of: opposing Iraq’s division and the Kurdistan Region’s independence and supporting Iraq’s territorial integrity on one hand; on the other hand, Tehran’s dealings with the Kurdistan Region are within the Iraqi framework as a complementary strategy between Shi’as and Kurds⁵². In this way, it can be said that Iran has by all means prevented the development of nationalist thought/nation-building in the Kurdistan Region because it will have effects and consequences on Iran’s Kurds in terms of inciting and awakening national and nationalistic feelings⁵³. In return, Iran’s support for the Kurdistan Region has been within the framework of two main objectives: one related to how to control the Kurdistan Region against Turkey and Western states’ hegemony; the other was reaching a common framework with the Shi’a component in Iraq for the purpose of protecting its hegemony and interests⁵⁴.

After issuing the decision to conduct the referendum, Iran at the level of the Foreign Ministry announced the country’s official position regarding the Kurdistan Region referendum: Iran’s fundamental and clear position is supporting Iraq’s territorial integrity, and the Kurdistan Region is part of the Iraqi state, and unilateral decision outside national and legal rules and frameworks, particularly Iraq’s constitution, especially in the current complex situation of Iraq and the region and the plans of adversaries for continuing instability in Iraq, only extends the creation of new problems in that country. Therefore, a united, stable, and democratic Iraq guarantees the interests of all national and sectarian components⁵⁵. Iran labeled conducting the referendum as a major threat and announced that for the sake of Iraq’s territorial integrity and preventing division, it would use all instruments and expressed its readiness for cooperation and coordination with Iraq and those countries that see the issue as a threat. Within this framework, each of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey at the level of foreign ministries, before conducting the referendum, issued a joint official statement and gave a strong warning to the Kurdistan Region⁵⁶. Iran is against any step that puts Iraq’s territorial integrity at risk. The late commander of Iran’s Quds Force, Qasem Soleimani, in a meeting with some Kurdistan Region leaders before conducting the referendum, clearly determined his country’s clear and explicit position that it is by all means against conducting the referendum⁵⁷. Because Tehran believed that the Kurdistan Region referendum, on one hand, incites Iran’s internal Kurds to stand against the Islamic Republic regime; on the other hand, this referendum creates negative effects on Tehran’s hegemony and projects at the regional level⁵⁸.

Therefore, Iran’s strong position and opposition to conducting the Kurdistan Region referendum process can be analyzed within the framework of the following reasons⁵⁹:

1. The establishment of an independent Kurdish state in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq would have a direct positive impact on Iranian Kurds. This referendum would take separatist Kurdish activities against the state not only in Iraq but in all those states over which Kurdish territory is divided to a stage that directly puts the territorial unity of countries at risk.
2. Support and the position of the State of Israel for the referendum process, from Iran’s perspective, was interpreted as a great threat. Tehran believed that the existence of a neighboring state supported by Israel is the greatest obstacle to Iran’s national security and interests, because from Tehran’s perspective, Israel can, through alliance with an independent Kurdistan state, nullify the strategic triangular balance of “Syria, Iran, and Iraq” against itself.
3. Iran feared that a Kurdish-Sunni state would be established on its borders and would have strong relations with Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. On the other hand, the presence of Western states’ military bases, above all, the American military base in the Kurdistan Region, could both limit Iran’s activities in the region and put greater pressure on Iran’s political regime. From here, Iran’s strategies at the regional level would face great obstacles and barriers.
4. The referendum would negatively affect Iraq’s territorial integrity; at the same time, it would affect the perspective of other components, particularly Sunnis, which would weaken Iran’s position and influence in Iraq.
5. The emergence of a Kurdish state, from Iran’s perspective, tends toward Turkey, which does not align with Tehran’s interests.

Therefore, Iran described this Kurdistan Region referendum as a great mistake and announced it would not deal with its results and would work with the federal Baghdad government to take necessary measures against the Kurdistan Region⁶⁰. Tehran and Ankara, at a high level, began coordination between them regarding their reaction to the referendum. On October 4, 2017, in Tehran, a joint meeting was held between the President of Turkey and the President of Iran. At the meeting, emphasis was placed on opposing the conduct of the referendum and not acting on its results⁶¹.

Iran, as a reaction to conducting the referendum, moved toward an agreement between Popular Mobilization Forces (Hashd al-Sha’bi) and the Iraqi government and some Kurdish forces to attack the Kurdistan Region, starting from the Kirkuk areas. On October 16, 2017, their attacks began. As a result, all those areas outside the Kurdistan Region administration that Kurdistan Peshmerga forces had controlled as a result of the ISIS war were placed under federal government authority⁶².

In the stage after 2005, Iran’s perspective toward the Kurdistan Region has been dealt with within the framework of strategy toward Iraq. This has been based on two main principles: one related to how the Kurdistan Region works with the Shi’a component within the framework of Tehran’s strategy and interests. The other principle was related to how to put pressure on the Kurdistan Region, either directly or indirectly, by the Iraqi federal government, to set a limit for the Kurdistan Region’s progress, whether at the level of the internal situation, through Iraq, or at the regional and global level.

Conclusion

The Iranian state was founded on the basis of one nation/Persian, one identity. If from 1925 to 1979 the national aspect was seen as the dominant aspect in state identity, then after the Islamic Revolution (from 1979 onward), the sectarian aspect was also deepened as a dominant factor of state identity, in such a way that the state was redefined on the basis of sectarian-national (Shi’ism-Persian-centered). This redefinition of the state is not only at the expense of marginalizing and denying other nations, but the state adopted a new, harsh, rigid mechanism for dissolving other components within the framework of a harsh and strict sectarian-national policy. For this purpose, political, military, cultural, and educational instruments have been used to dissolve other components apart from Persians, particularly Kurds, within the framework of state identity. Although in the state constitution, Kurds have been granted some cultural and social rights, these rights have not been reflected in reality and practice.

After the establishment of political authority in the Kurdistan Region, Iran deals with events and developments with great sensitivity, because it believes that any change in the Kurdistan Region will have a direct impact on Iran’s Kurds. On this basis, the Kurdistan Region has been seen by Iran as a major security threat. From this perspective, any step by the Kurdistan Region nationally and politically toward progress has been interpreted by Tehran as a threat and danger.

The transformation of the Kurdistan Region in terms of development, institutionalization, democratization, political and social integration is seen as a threat to the state’s interests and security. Iran, in response to this, has used two mechanisms to reduce the effects of the Kurdistan Region’s transformation on its interests: one mechanism was related to preventing progress and transformations in the Kurdistan Region through available instruments; the second mechanism was managing the situation within the framework of its interests, meaning the goal was that it should not create negative effects on the security of state identity and not become a threat.