Introduction

Soft power, a term formulated by Joseph Nye, has become an influential concept in modern international politics. Unlike hard power, which relies on military force and economic pressure, soft power refers to a nation’s ability to attract and influence other countries through cultural, educational, and humanitarian initiatives. For Russia, which is striving to enhance its global standing, soft power has become a vital tool in its foreign policy arsenal.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union—and particularly at the start of the 21st century—Russia has made significant efforts to wield soft power in various regions, including the Middle East. A key example of this is Iraq, where Russia has been actively fostering cultural, economic, and humanitarian relations.

This paper aims to explore the primary aspects of Russia’s soft power in Iraq, including its cultural and educational programs, economic cooperation, military-technical partnerships, and humanitarian aid. By examining these factors, we can gain a clearer understanding of how Russia leverages soft power to achieve its broader strategic goals, both globally and specifically within Iraq.

The Concept of Soft Power

The concept of soft power (referred to as “мягкая сила” in Russian) was introduced by American scholar Joseph Nye in the 1980s and 1990s. It refers to a state’s ability to achieve its strategic goals through cultural, ideological, informational, and economic interactions with foreign societies, without resorting to force—such as military intervention or economic coercion. According to Nye, soft power enables a country to shape public opinion in other nations and cultivate an attractive national image, fostering goodwill toward the state employing this strategy.

In the past, it was commonly believed that military force and economic sanctions were the only ways to resolve international conflicts. Today, however, soft power—grounded in empathy, idealism, and positive perceptions—plays a pivotal role. While the economic and military resources of any state are finite and can be depleted through the use of “hard power,” soft power allows a country to avoid the economic and social disruptions that come with military action, thus preserving its long-term capacity in these critical areas.

Russian Soft Power in the 21st Century

Historically, Russia has contributed immensely to global civilization through its rich cultural heritage in art and literature. However, the use of soft power and public diplomacy in international relations was not a significant focus for the country. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia faced a profound economic and social crisis, leaving soft power on the back burner for the nation’s leadership. While some Soviet-era institutions related to soft power continued to operate in the Russian Federation during this period, they remained underfunded, ineffective, and largely unproductive.

The process of institutionalizing soft power in Russia began before the concept officially entered the state’s political culture. A pivotal step in this direction was the creation of the “Russkiy Mir” Foundation by President Vladimir Putin. “Russkiy Mir” is a public organization founded by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Education, and Science, with the primary goal of promoting the Russian language and culture abroad, as well as exporting and supporting Russian educational initiatives.

The turning point in Russia’s use of soft power occurred in July 2012 when presidential candidate Vladimir Putin acknowledged at a meeting of Russian ambassadors and permanent representatives that Russia was falling behind international competitors who had already developed and implemented effective soft power strategies. He stated, “We have not created an image of Russia abroad, so it is often distorted and does not reflect the real situation in our country, nor does it reflect our contribution to world civilization, culture, and science. Our country’s position in international affairs is viewed from one perspective. We are guilty of not explaining our positions and views properly.” In this context, Joseph Nye believes that Putin has recognized the interdependence of soft and hard power; however, he seems to struggle with effectively utilizing soft power at this stage.

Another significant development in Russia’s soft power strategy was the establishment of a dedicated department for soft power issues within the Russian Foreign Ministry in 2021. This department was created due to the absence of a centralized body within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to oversee cultural and humanitarian cooperation at the international level. The responsibilities of this department include formulating Russia’s overarching soft power policy, setting priorities, monitoring the implementation of government programs in this area, and providing advisory support and practical assistance to both relevant government agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Russian Soft Power Strategies and Directions

Russia’s soft power strategy operates in multiple directions, targeting specific regions or groups. By leveraging its historical, cultural, and political characteristics, Russia strategically selects particular areas and demographics it aims to attract and influence through soft power initiatives. Below, we discuss two primary directions of Russian soft power.

1.2.1 Russian History and Culture

The first direction of Russian soft power is grounded in its history and culture, aiming to foster a shared sense of belonging among the Russian minority abroad, often referred to as the “Russian world.” This strategy seeks to influence the Russian diaspora through two main avenues:

First, it encourages the return of these citizens to Russia under a state plan initiated in 2007, which has thus far benefitted approximately 900,000 people. Second, it provides support to Russian immigrants abroad, allowing them to maintain connections with their homeland while receiving cultural and, at times, political backing from Russia. The objectives differ based on the location of Russians living in Europe, North America, and Israel. Due to their limited cultural presence and daily interaction with Russia, these communities are often motivated to preserve their Russian identity, participate in cultural events, and promote a positive image of Russia abroad while also investing in their home country. “Ros Satrudnichestvo” and, to a lesser extent, the “Russkiy Mir” Foundation serve as the primary institutional and financial conduits in this regard.

The second tier of this first direction focuses on nurturing a sense of religious brotherhood to influence Orthodox countries, particularly in the Balkans, with Cyprus and Greece being key targets. In the Middle East, the Russian Orthodox Church engages in para-diplomatic activities among Eastern Christians, assisting the Russian state in its spiritual and civil endeavors as it seeks to re-establish its political presence in the region. The Church plays a significant role in attracting influential pro-Russian business and political circles in Lebanon and, more broadly, throughout the Christian world, which is deeply affected by religious dynamics in the Middle East. Thus, it can be argued that the Russian Orthodox Church has become a vital strategic asset for the Kremlin in the unfolding events in Syria and its neighboring areas.

1.2.2 Ideology and State Management

Another significant direction in Russia’s soft power strategy revolves around ideology and governance, encompassing three main areas: conservative morality, illiberal values, and sovereignty.

Conservative Morality: Russia positions itself as a defender of “traditional family values,” which resonates with those who oppose movements advocating for sexual minorities and women’s rights, not only in Europe but also in Africa and the Middle East. Russian representatives play a notable role in international platforms such as the World Congress of Families, and they have established communication channels with the Vatican through the Orthodox Church. Examples of this Russian “moral conservatism” can be seen in its alliances with conservative Catholics and the American right-wing Christian movement.

Illiberal Governance: The spread of illiberal governance, which extends from Turkey and Israel to Brazil and the Philippines, is often discussed in political literature as a manifestation of Russian soft power. However, this perspective is more controversial and cannot be directly interpreted as a result of Russian influence. The emergence of illiberal governments in specific countries is primarily linked to their unique political and domestic circumstances.

Sovereignty: The challenge posed by the modern world order and U.S. hegemony is another area where Russia seeks to establish itself as a leader and advocate for sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty underscores the importance of protecting national integrity, serving as a cornerstone of both domestic and foreign policy. Moscow promotes sovereignty across three domains: political, cultural, and economic, which we will briefly outline here.

For Russia, political legitimacy is vested solely in nation-states, allowing citizens to express their will through elections. Consequently, powers should not be delegated to unelected supranational institutions. Russia aims to restore a world order that acknowledges the spheres of influence of great powers, a principle emphasized since the Yalta Conference.

In the economic realm, Russia stresses the importance of safeguarding its national economy from the adverse effects of globalization. It advocates for the preservation and development of domestic industrial production and labor while opposing the authoritarian tendencies of international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

National sovereignty is also defined by the composition of a nation. This raises questions about who belongs to that nation and its fundamental, unchangeable cultural characteristics. In this context, the dominant nation within each nation-state is afforded the right to cultivate its culture, while foreigners, immigrants, and minorities are expected to accept the prevailing culture, as is reflected in the practical realities within Russia itself.

1.3 Russian Soft Power Tools

Russia employs various soft power tools to achieve its foreign policy objectives and attract attention internationally. Among these, education stands out as one of the most effective tools in Russia’s soft power arsenal. Russian universities offer high-quality education, which plays a central role in this strategy. According to the 2018 ranking by QS (a British company specializing in higher education and research), Russia ranked 15th out of 50 countries in international research rankings, reflecting the progress of Russian education.

A key aspect of Russia’s soft power in education is the provision of free educational opportunities to foreign students. As they study in Russia, these students not only acquire knowledge but also become familiar with the Russian language, scientific achievements, and cultural heritage. Upon returning home, they often act as informal ambassadors of Russian culture. The number of international students in Russia has been growing steadily, and this trend shows no signs of slowing down. In 2020, the Russian government increased the quota for foreign students from 15,000 to 18,000 for the year 2021. This number was further increased to 23,000 in 2022 and to 30,000 in 2023. Moreover, Russia encourages continued collaboration with its graduates abroad, supporting initiatives aimed at maintaining ties with foreign alumni associations. By 2022, these associations were active in 68 countries, further integrating Russian-educated professionals into Russia’s soft power framework.

Language also plays a vital role in Russia’s soft power strategy. The Pushkin Institute, a state institution, is responsible for training Russian language instructors and developing effective methods for teaching Russian as a foreign language. The institute also organizes annual Russian Language Olympiads for both children and adults, particularly in Russia and post-Soviet countries.

Additionally, Russia leverages its cultural and historical heritage as a soft power tool. The literary works of renowned Russian authors such as Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Chekhov, and Pushkin have been translated into numerous languages, while composers like Tchaikovsky and Rimsky-Korsakov enjoy global recognition.

To implement its soft power programs, Russia relies on several key institutions, including:

Rossotrudnichestvo: Established in 2008, this Federal Agency oversees numerous Russian cultural and scientific centres abroad. It operates 90 representative offices in 75 countries. Rossotrudnichestvo’s responsibilities include supporting Russian citizens abroad, promoting the Russian language and culture, fostering youth cooperation, and advancing public diplomacy. The agency also manages the promotion of Russian education abroad and selects foreign students to study in Russia, all with the goal of creating a positive and objective image of Russia internationally.

The Gorchakov Fund for Public Diplomacy Support: Founded in 2010, this institution promotes public diplomacy, intellectual and cultural exchange, and scientific cooperation, aiming to enhance Russia’s influence abroad and foster favourable political, social, and commercial conditions.

Additionally, the International Council of Russian Citizens works to unite the Russian diaspora, creating a cultural, informational, and educational space to strengthen ties with Russians living abroad.

Despite having a well-developed institutional network for soft power, the activities and initiatives of these institutions sometimes suffer from a lack of coordination. This disorganization, particularly in the division of responsibilities, can lead to inefficiencies, reducing the overall effectiveness of Russia’s soft power efforts.

Russian Soft Power in Iraq

Following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, Russia began to re-establish its relationship with Iraq, gradually revealing both the strengths and weaknesses of its soft power approach in the region. To understand this dynamic, it is essential to first examine the core principles guiding Russian foreign policy and identify the unique characteristics that differentiate Russian diplomacy from that of other nations.

Russian Diplomatic Approach and Principles in Relations with Iraq

Russia’s diplomatic approach to Iraq can be categorized into three main groups:

1. General principles governing Russia’s relations with foreign states.

2. Specific principles for Russia’s relations with Islamic states.

3. Distinct approaches and principles unique to Iraq.

1. General Methods and Principles

The foundation of Russia’s general diplomatic approach includes respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, adherence to international law, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Additionally, Moscow focuses on strengthening international security, combating terrorism, resolving conflicts through peaceful means, and fostering bilateral relationships based on mutual and equal interests.

2. Principles Governing Relations with Islamic States

Islam is a significant factor in both Russia’s domestic and foreign policy, which has led Russian diplomacy to develop specific principles for engaging with Islamic nations. The foremost principle is respect for Islam, both within and outside of Russia. While this is primarily a domestic policy, the way Russia treats its Muslim citizens has implications for its relations with Islamic countries. This was evident in the response of Russian Muslims to the violence against Myanmar’s Muslim minority, showcasing the sensitivity of the global Muslim community toward the treatment of their co-religionists.

The second principle is engaging with different branches of Islam. According to Russian scholar S.V. Kortunov, Iraq’s political landscape is shaped by two major Islamic influences: moderate Islam and Iranian Islam. Moderate Islam, a secular version of political Islam that once enjoyed support from the Soviet Union, is now in decline. In contrast, Iran’s version of Islam is not seen as a threat to Russian interests, and its growing influence in Iraq does not pose a challenge to Russia’s regional ambitions.

3. Unique Approaches and Principles for Iraq

Russia’s foreign policy toward Iraq must account for the country’s unique characteristics, most notably the Kurdish separatist factor. While the Kurdistan Region has its own autonomous government and military, it remains part of Iraq, with ongoing tensions between Erbil and Baghdad, particularly over energy resources and disputed territories.

Russia’s policy here is clear: it maintains a non-interference stance in Iraq’s internal affairs. Moscow believes that any changes within Iraq, including those related to the Kurdish issue, must be achieved through negotiations between the central government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government in Erbil. Russia seeks to balance its relations with both Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region. To this end, in addition to its embassy in Baghdad, Russia has established a Consulate General in Erbil, and the Kurdistan Regional Government has opened a representation office in Russia. This balanced approach reflects Russia’s commitment to maintaining positive relations with all key actors in Iraq.

Areas of Russian Soft Power in Iraq

Over the past two decades, as Russian-Iraqi relations have strengthened—particularly in the areas of energy and military cooperation, and in light of developments in Syria—Iraqi society has become increasingly familiar with Russia and its culture. This section explores Russia’s soft power influence in Iraq in practice.

Language and Education

Russia has been actively working to promote and strengthen the position of the Russian language among Iraqi students and intellectuals through various departments and centers. One of the key institutions in this effort is the Department of Russian Language and Literature at the University of Baghdad. This department, which currently employs 50 faculty members—including three professors and several lecturers with master’s and doctoral degrees—teaches 310 students across 39 different subjects, such as grammar, writing, reading, Russian literature, and translation.

In addition to the University of Baghdad, Dar al-Ma’omen, a Russian language research and development center supervised by the Iraqi Ministry of Culture, plays a significant role in translating Russian literature, especially children’s books, into Arabic. Moreover, in 2018, a Russian Language Department was opened at the University of Samarra in Salahaddin Province, where 20 students are currently enrolled and taught by six faculty members. A similar department was established at Wasit University, although it was later suspended due to a shortage of staff. Meanwhile, the University of Sulaimani in the Kurdistan Region has also expressed interest in launching a Russian language program.

In recent years, there has been a steady increase in the number of Iraqi students seeking to study in Russia. For example, in 2017, approximately 1,900 students applied, representing a 10% increase from the previous year. In the same year, 167 Iraqi students were granted scholarships to study in Russia, provided by the Russian Federal Ministry of Science and Higher Education. According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, during his visit to Iraq in February 2023, the number of Iraqi students studying in Russian universities had reached 4,200. Plans are underway to increase the number of free seats available to Iraqi students in Russian universities, with an additional 60 Iraqi Foreign Ministry employees admitted to the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic Academy. Engineering and medical studies are particularly popular among Iraqi students.

While the presence of Russian language departments in Iraqi universities is growing and the demand for Russian language skills is increasing, there are still challenges hindering the broader spread of Russian language education in Iraq. These challenges include a lack of e-dictionaries, visual learning resources, and qualified instructors. In some cases, teaching staff lack formal experience in Russian studies. Additionally, there are no Russian-Iraqi cultural centers similar to Rossotrudnichestvo that would promote Russian language and culture through organized activities. These deficiencies, combined with financial and technical constraints, limit the full potential of Russia’s soft power in Iraq.

Despite these obstacles, Russia has continued to leverage education and language as effective soft power tools. The country’s increasing influence in global energy markets, as well as its military and economic presence in the region—particularly after the Syrian conflict—has fueled a growing desire among Iraqi students to study Russian and pursue higher education in Russia. Through these avenues, Russia aims to create a positive and objective image of itself among Iraq’s elites and broader society.

Commerce and Energy

Despite the strong presence and influence of the United States, Iraqi authorities have consistently expressed a desire to strengthen trade and economic ties with Russia. Over the past decade, these relations have seen steady growth, with the volume of trade reaching $150 million in 2011. However, this figure fell short of the aspirations of both nations’ leadership.

Historically, the core areas of trade and economic cooperation between Iraq and Russia have been centered on the military-technical sector and energy, a relationship that dates back to the Soviet era. Both Moscow and Baghdad have prioritized the expansion of ties in these fields. For example, in October 2012, the two countries signed several contracts for the supply of Russian military equipment to Iraq, amounting to $4.2 billion.

In the energy sector, Russian companies have found favorable conditions to operate within Iraq. With its relatively low operating costs, Iraq’s oil fields have become a major focus for Russian energy giants such as Lukoil, Bashneft, and Rosneft, all of which have invested heavily in developing these fields. Both Lukoil and Gazprom have secured multiple contracts for the exploration and development of oil fields in Iraq, including in the Kurdistan Region.

A significant step forward in the energy relationship between the two countries is the participation of Russian oil and gas companies in geological exploration and natural gas development projects in Iraq. Recently, Iraq’s leadership has undertaken key initiatives to develop natural gas fields, particularly by attracting Gazprom Neft to oversee the geological exploration, development, and production of gas at the Mansoura field.

Beyond energy, Iraq is eager to develop bilateral relations with Russia in several other sectors, notably electricity, transportation, and social infrastructure. Additionally, Iraq has expressed interest in increasing the volume of Russian agricultural and food product imports, which include sunflower oil, flour, wheat, and barley. Iraqi demand for Russian agricultural products is on the rise, especially for animal feed and poultry meat.

According to the Russian Federal Customs Agency, Russian exports of timber and related products to Iraq grew by 15%, from $26.5 million in 2019 to $31 million in 2020. Iron ore exports saw an even greater increase, rising by 43%, from $14.9 million to $21.4 million. Exports of electrical appliances and equipment, including medical devices and materials for the oil and gas industry, surged by 35%.

Recently, Iraq has intensified efforts to develop its domestic capacity for processing agricultural products, such as grains, vegetable oils, and raw sugar. Russia could play a pivotal role in supporting this initiative, particularly through the construction of large silos, provision of equipment, and development of agricultural infrastructure.

The electricity sector represents a vital area of cooperation between Iraq and Russia, particularly regarding the resumption of work on several unfinished power generation facilities that are strategically important for Iraq. These include the Al-Kharta Thermal Power Plant, Aliusfiya Thermal Power Plant, Dibis Thermal Power Plant, and the Al-Adaim Hydropower Plant. For both Russia and Iraq, completing these projects is a priority. However, previous contracts with Russian companies working on these projects were canceled, and no new agreements have been signed. As a result, the future of these power plants remains uncertain.

In the realm of medicine and pharmaceuticals, Russia has proven to be an essential partner for Iraq. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Russian vaccines were registered in Iraq, and Russia expressed its readiness to provide Iraq with the necessary vaccines. Beyond vaccines, Iraq is interested in developing partnerships with Russian manufacturers to supply medicines and medical devices. Russian private companies have also shown willingness to invest in Iraq’s medical sector, particularly following the removal of pandemic-related barriers. This sector holds great promise for future collaboration.

Another promising avenue for cooperation is the financial and banking sector. Given Iraq’s national currency reform plans, Iraqi authorities are open to considering the involvement of the Russian company Goznak JSC in the issuance of new currency. To further strengthen Russian-Iraqi trade and economic relations, it is crucial to implement more robust financial and non-financial export support mechanisms. In addition, under current global circumstances, developing alternative financial and banking systems—especially those bypassing SWIFT and avoiding reliance on the U.S. banking system—has become increasingly important for facilitating contracts between the two nations.

As previously mentioned, Russia is heavily involved in Iraq’s oil and gas sector. Russian companies have secured major contracts to develop Iraq’s oil and gas fields, and they are also playing a critical role in rebuilding and modernizing the country’s energy infrastructure. This includes the construction of pipelines, refineries, and other essential facilities, all of which help bolster Iraq’s energy industry while also increasing Russia’s influence in this key sector.

In agriculture, Russia is a significant supplier of grain and other agricultural products to Iraq, helping to enhance the country’s food security. This trade fosters a positive image of Russia as a reliable partner. Furthermore, Russia is also a key player in supporting the development of Iraq’s domestic agricultural sector.

Russia’s approach to Iraq is multi-faceted, covering areas such as language and education, energy, trade, and agriculture, all while adhering to the principle of non-interference in Iraq’s internal affairs. Through these areas of cooperation, Russia aims to increase its influence in Iraq, foster a positive image, and challenge the perception that Iraq falls under the exclusive influence of the United States. In the coming years, we anticipate that Russian-Iraqi relations will continue to expand, with Russia’s growing political and military presence in the region paving the way for deeper cultural and economic engagement in Iraq.

Conclusion

1. Russia is significantly trying to strengthen its influence in Iraq and is developing bilateral relations primarily through investments in the energy, agriculture, trade, and technical-military sectors.

2. Through soft power, Russia aims to create a positive image of itself in the eyes of the Iraqi elite by employing various cultural and media tools.

3. In education and language, Russia is actively promoting its culture and enhancing the position of the Russian language in Iraq. The presence of several Russian language departments in Iraqi universities and the annual awarding of scholarships to Iraqi students are testaments to this commitment.

4. Russia has sought to establish equal and balanced diplomatic relations with both Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, adhering to the principle of non-interference in Iraqi internal affairs.

Suggestions and Recommendations

1. In developing future relations, Iraq can leverage Russia’s capabilities across various fields. As a world power and a leader in military, economic, and agricultural domains, Iraq stands to benefit from Russian expertise, technology, and increased trade opportunities.

2. The success of Russian cultural and educational programs in Iraq, such as attracting Iraqi students to study in Russian universities, will foster a positive attitude towards Russia among Iraqi youth. This aligns with one of the goals of Russia’s soft power strategy. The Russian side should prioritize this area by providing more opportunities for Iraqi students, including streamlining visa issuance and residency procedures to attract a larger student body.

3. To enhance its cultural and educational influence in Iraq, Russia should consider opening branches of renowned Russian universities in developed Iraqi cities, such as the American University in Sulaymaniyah and Duhok. Additionally, establishing cultural centers to promote Russian culture in Iraq is essential. It is particularly important now to initiate the opening of branches of Ross Satrudnichestve and Russkiy Mir in Iraq.

4. Another vital aspect is the development of the tourism sector. Russia is perceived as a closed country by many Iraqis. While there is considerable demand among Iraqi citizens to visit Russia for tourism, restrictive visa policies hinder the growth of this sector. The Russian government should review its laws regarding tourist visas. Currently, direct flights between the two countries are limited, operating only a few times a week from Baghdad to Moscow.

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• This paper was authored by (Keywan Sadiq Mohammed) and published in the Journal of Future Studies (JFS) in Kurdish. It has been translated by (Hevar Sherzad) for Kfuture.Media.