By: Zirek Ahmad Rahman
In the Kurdistan Region, according to the existing religious heritage, the majority of people adhered to a national form of religion, if not all of them, until various Islamic movements emerged. From that point onward, this mode of religious thinking and religiosity among the people took on diverse forms. Undoubtedly, each type of thinking among these different movements has attracted its own following. These movements possessed their own distinct discourse, easily distinguishable from any other movement. Naturally, some of these movements and their discourses have occasionally clashed to the point of excluding each other from the sphere of Islam and faith. All these matters have had, and continue to have, varying degrees of influence on the political arena and the social fabric of Kurdish society. Each discourse and movement has undergone transformative discourse from one era to another, according to the policies these movements implement.
First: National Islam
Among most peoples, when a religion arrives, it may initially reach them letter by letter as it is. However, later on, generation after generation and after hundreds of years, it becomes impossible for the implementation of this religion to remain as it originally was. Undoubtedly, that society exchanges a collection of beliefs, culture, and internal identity with religion. This is apart from whether the religion itself arrived precisely letter by letter as it was, or whether it reached Kurdish society through the hands of the second, third, or subsequent generations after the first and second generations of the religion. According to some religious researchers, national Islam consists of those religious customs that do not rely heavily on religious texts from the Quran and Hadith, unlike official Islam which stands [1] upon the texts of the Quran and Hadith. This may be difficult for national Islam, as when individuals in Kurdish society have adhered to most understandings of Islamic religion through their own domestic understanding, particularly the pillars of Islam and faith. Therefore, in contrast to this understanding, there is another view that suggests it is better to describe national and official Islam as actual Islam and textual Islam [2], thereby separating text from the reality of society. It is difficult for religion to remain unchanged while text remains dependent on reality; thus, religion automatically becomes several internal versions according to society. Accordingly, national Islam was mostly formed within the framework of guidance from mosque mullahs and Sufi sheikhs, who themselves were aware of Islamic texts to their own extent. Therefore, in the academic field, this type of religiosity has sometimes been called adapted Islam, harmonized Islam, or culturalized Islam [3]. Consequently, in general terms and with these understandings, the discourse of national Islam in Kurdish society becomes more concentrated in performing acts of worship as a religious heritage among members of society. It is not deeply mixed with ideological and intellectual matters; rather, it is more the product of traditional mosques. Generally speaking, religion becomes part of the lives of those individuals who practice this type of religiosity. This type of religiosity is in decline because other Islamic movements have come at the expense of this type of religiosity. Therefore, even these movements, ideologies, and directions that have emerged have even infiltrated the mosques and have varying degrees of influence on them. In Kurdish society, the discourse of national Islam is more evident in the performance of prayers, giving of zakat, breaking the fast, performing hajj, mawlid recitations, Shab-e-Barat, one night of Laylat al-Qadr, visiting cemeteries and the graves of pious people and saints, not consuming orphans’ property, distributing inheritance, the prohibition of milk kinship and usury, and avoiding fornication, etc. The majority of mullahs’ discourse was within this framework, and at a higher level than national religion, a more Sufi and mystical movement existed within Kurdish society. Therefore, in the period before the emergence of formal education, the vast majority of Kurdish politicians, poets, and educated personalities were graduates of these mosques that existed in mosques, takyas, and khaneqahs. Therefore, the official institutional heir of this version of Islam in Kurdistan is primarily the Union of Islamic Scholars. From its establishment until now, its leaders have been graduates of these mosques, presumably not mixed with other forms of Islam.
Second: Political Islam
This term has several different definitions, from within these movements themselves to their opponents and external definitions for them. Generally speaking, political Islam refers to those Islamic parties that were formed after the fall of the Ottoman state with the aim of establishing a state where Sharia would rule and to confront nationalist and Western forces, or these are forces that attempt to restore the rule of the caliphate or something similar to the caliphate, or it is a political effort to reform Muslim society to confront Eastern and Western forces, through the Islamization of societal institutions such as Islamic thought, Islamic art, Islamic economics, and Islamic banking, etc. [4]. Political Islam, which arose in the Arab world and later spread to other countries, generally had the discourse of this movement, with all its directions, oriented toward bringing people back to the path of religion and Islamizing them, or establishing the sovereignty of religious rule. However, according to their directions and parties, their mechanisms and functions differed, which eventually caused these goals for which they were created and their actual functioning to diverge in different directions.
Islamic Movement
Although this party no longer has much political presence, especially after the 2024 elections when they failed to win any parliamentary seats in any city, due to its long history under this name, it has been included in this research. From the beginning of its formation in the mountains and through several rounds of internal warfare after the uprising, this party has had more of a jihadist and militant discourse, with less inclination toward nationalist discourse. The Afghan jihad era and the countries of the Caucasus had significant influence on this party’s supporters in the past. After the 1999 unification with the Islamic Revival Movement under the name of the Islamic Unity Movement [5], this militant discourse escalated further as a mixture of proselytizing and jihad discourse together. However, this did not last long. After two years in 2001, due to disagreements over power transfer and the existence of several different schools of thought, this unity fragmented [6]. Remnants of old cadres and people close to the family of Mullah Ali Halabjah remained around this party. After this, despite numerous attempts at reorganization and strengthening, due to the dominance of Mullah Ali’s family over this party and after disagreements over leadership between Kamil Haji Ali and Irfan Mullah Ali, the party split again into the Islamic Union Movement and the Islamic Movement [7]. The religious discourse of the Islamic Movement is more of an emotional discourse inherited from the era of this party’s armed struggle, with greater attachment to events in neighboring countries related to political Islam issues, such as Palestine, Turkey, Afghanistan, and other topics [8]. In terms of their existence and influence on Muslim believers in the region, they do not have such an influence. Similarly, the Islamic Union Movement, by virtue of naming this party wing with that name, is more of an attachment to the name of a political party within the literature of political Islam in Kurdistan. The religious discourse of this party also falls within this framework. Neither of these two wings is close to national Islam; rather, the early confrontations between political Islam and national Islam occurred more with the Movement. Due to the fact that other parties did not have a clear relationship with the question of religion, this arena remained available for Islamists.
Kurdistan Islamic Union
Although this party has a long and distant history in Kurdistan, it was not known by the name of Union but rather as the first line of the Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood). Perhaps the leadership of most Islamic parties in the Kurdistan Region had dealings with Ikhwan organizations [9]. This party declared itself in 1994 under the name of the Kurdistan Islamic Union [10]. This term “declaration” is clear and different from establishment, meaning it had been established for some time, but self-announcement under this name was a new matter on the political scene in the Kurdistan Region. Until before the announcement, they were generally known as Ikhwan, and their activities were in those mosques whose prayer leaders and preachers had historically been affiliated with Iraqi Ikhwan organizations. Generally speaking, the Union’s discourse is presumably within the framework of the Ikhwan manhaj (methodology), neither in jurisprudence nor in beliefs does this party have a specific direction. It is more dependent on religious figures close to this party’s guidance school, such as Qaradawi, Qaradaghi, Hawa, and others. Therefore, the Union’s religious discourse has fundamentally been a proselytizing (da’wa) and educational discourse for surrounding individuals. Consequently, it is observed that in those societies where Ikhwan have significant activity, the greatest ideological influence of Ikhwan and the least political presence of Ikhwan is evident. In the region, Ikhwan attempts to raise the hijab rate through the Golden Crown festivals [11] and various activities such as the Happiness Project and charitable and proselytizing associations [12]. Even in the most recent activity of collecting aid and donations for Gaza, millions of dollars have been collected from the region’s people. However, from the uprising until now, this party has not become the owner of a quarter of the votes of this country’s people, the vast majority of whom are Muslims. Also, another aspect of this party’s discourse is as the Kurdish voice of those events that the global Ikhwan calls for, such as Gaza, Burma, Turkey, and Qatar. To some extent, there have been individuals within this party who have a nationalist voice like Abu Bakr Haladni, or a democratic voice like Abu Bakr Karwani, or any other Sufi voice, etc. However, ultimately, the dominant voice is the Ikhwan discourse, which overshadows any other voice within this party. This is while another type of Turkish Islamic thought has had a significant influence on this party: Erdoganism. This is because Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s political role has a strong influence on global Ikhwan, due to the fact that after the coup by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the current president of Egypt, against former Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi, many Ikhwan leaders were imprisoned and others were scattered across countries. Turkey became a refuge for them, so Turkey’s movements have always been a guide for Ikhwan and its various components [13]. This influence is not only during the period of Ikhwan’s defeat; during Ikhwan’s rule in Egypt, books were published praising Erdogan and he was called a leader [14]. Not only this, but a specific preacher like Ragheb Sergani published four times a book of 350 pages in the same year titled “The Story of Erdogan,” which is filled with praise and justification for those policies they do not like. In the strongest stance, he appears as an advisor from the caliphate era to a caliph and compares him to Nur ad-Din Zengi, Saladin al-Ayyubi, Saif ad-Din Qutuz, and Zahir Baybars [15]. If this is how the Ikhwan guidance school mobilizes, it is very natural for small branches of Ikhwan or Ikhwan supporters to also fall under this influence. This has indirectly influenced the religious discourse of this party, with their mullahs and preachers describing it as an Ottoman role hand in hand with prayer. This is different from the early Ikhwan discourse that existed in the early years, which was more influenced by Ikhwan preachers and leaders in the Arab world.
Komal
This party emerged from within the Islamic Unity Movement in 2001 after Mullah Ali Halabjah’s leadership refused to accept the results of the Unity Movement’s first congress. Initially, it was established under the name Islamic Group (Komal), positioning itself as the heir to the Movement under the emirate of Ali Bapir. Later, in 2021, at the party’s fourth congress, the name was changed to the Kurdish Justice Group, and the position of Emir became President [16]. Given that the Unity Movement consisted of the Islamic Movement and Islamic Revival, which in terms of thought was a mixture of jihadist, Salafi, and background influence from the Islamic Revolution and Ikhwan, the Islamic Group similarly, when the Unity Movement became divided, did not mean that each direction alone became a party, but rather several wings emerged from it, with each wing containing a proportion of these thoughts and opinions. Therefore, Komal also has a Salafi direction, but different from Madkhali, Halabi, and another Salafism. The jihadist tendency within Komal has come as an emotional heritage, so Komal supporters readily sense this on social media and in their discourse whenever any Islamic movement in the world engages in armed activity. Therefore, the influence of events like Gaza on Komal differs from the Union, because Hamas’s jihadist aspect influences Komal more, just as the Union is influenced by Hamas’s Ikhwan aspect. This is clearly reflected in their discourse. Also, like the Union, Komal’s discourse, apart from this, has a charitable discourse more reflected in the charitable organization Bakhshin [17]. This charitable organization is known for donations and assistance to the poor. Also, like charitable organizations close to the Union, it has assisted Gaza victims and has a hospital in Sulaymaniyah city.
Also, another discourse of Komal is greater emphasis on the moral issues of society. This same discourse exists with the Union and other Islamists, particularly issues related to women and sex. This often intensifies during elections, as a tool to attack the ruling forces. This is apart from the fact that the discourse of the Union and Komal, due to being more in the position of opposition to the regional government, has become a discourse that religion is the cause of this corruption and poor administration of the region, as if these forces’ distance from religion is the cause of corruption. This type of political Islam discourse in general, and these two parties, easily have influence on ordinary Muslims. Therefore, for religious people dissatisfied with the country’s management, they easily become a replacement for national Islam.
Third: Salafi Islam
The beginning of Salafism in the Kurdistan Region was in the sixties through Mullah Hamdi Abdul Majid Salafi, who was one of the first students of Muhammad Nasir al-Albani [18]. Al-Albani is one of the highest scholarly authorities of Salafism. Although al-Albani had strong influence on the Arab scene, particularly in Saudi Arabia, Mullah Hamdi did not have that influence on the Kurdish scene. Later, from the eighties to the nineties, the second generation of Salafis entered the arena, in two directions. One direction was a continuation of Hamdi Salafi’s movement, the most well-known of this movement being Mullah Omar Salafi (Chingiani) [19]. The other movement, which was a mixture of party Salafi and jihadist, was influenced by the Islamic Movement of that time and known as jihadist Salafi, the most well-known being Mullah Krekar [20]. Although the first movement was described in some sources as scholarly Salafi, at that time in Kurdistan they were known as “la-jama’i” (non-groupist). Although Mullah Hamdi’s personality was very close to Barzani in the sixties, the la-jama’i movement was generally known for not being close to political issues positively or negatively, so their political discourse was leftist.
On the other hand, within la-jama’i Salafism, a group emerged under the influence of Saudi preachers Rabee al-Madkhali and the African Amanullah Jami, who consider themselves the true heirs of Salafism. Their media presence is evident on social media, guidance channels, and the Bahasht website. The most prominent figure of this group’s direction is the personality of Abdul Latif Ahmad. Although this direction is the product of several conflicts within the house of Salafism, currently this direction has become more the visible face (wajihah) of Salafism. In this discussion, wherever Salafism is mentioned, this direction is meant.
Of course, describing this Salafi direction as Madkhali may be a methodological error, because the Salafi movement and its branches and offshoots are continuously subjected to conflicts and fragmentation. Although Abdul Latif Ahmad’s personality, at the beginning of his emergence, had a solid relationship with Rabee al-Madkhali, made several visits, and had al-Madkhali’s endorsement (tazkiyah) as methodological and creedal support, describing him as a great personality and a guardian Salafi throughout Iraq [21]. However, this movement, as the saying goes, cannot live without enemies, so naturally among themselves they easily fall into conflicts and become enemies of each other. All this endorsement by Rabee al-Madkhali does not continue; al-Madkhali disassociates from him, calling him misguided and without grace. This guidance movement was forced to search for another guide, namely Ali al-Halabi, an old friend and current enemy of Rabee al-Madkhali. Therefore, in the classification of Salafism’s branches and offshoots, this direction is now counted among the Halabis [22]. This is while this direction is still known as Madkhali until now.
Therefore, we can classify Salafis into these directions:
Anti-authority: These are more from the old jihadists within the Islamists and those who oppose the theory of the sanctity of the ruler (wali al-amr). They are described by their enemies as Takfiri. Alongside issues of monotheism, innovation, etc., they insist greatly on the issue of sovereignty and legitimate governance.
Neutral: These see themselves in the Madkhalis, who are a small faction at present, as well as the Halabis, who are the direction of the Bahasht channel. These are not anti-authority; rather, they are supportive. They trace the root of this issue back to the righteous predecessors of this movement’s submission to the rulers of countries.
Between these two directions, there is a mixed, muddy direction, from silence regarding politics to shameful criticism.
Generally speaking, the totality of Salafi discourse in all its directions is very insistent on the issue of monotheism, faith, polytheism, and the smallest matter of this type in the common beliefs of people becomes the focus of this direction’s attention. This is why Salafis clash more with national Islam than Islamists do. On the other hand, both the Madkhali and Halabi movements, due to their submission to obedience to the ruler (wali al-amr), bring authority from this perspective ahead at the expense of national Islam and its mullahs. This often puts authority in a dilemma in dealing with two such opposing sides. However, generally speaking, attention to all Salafi movements has fallen more in the green zone; the yellow zone, through the Union of Scholars, pays more attention to national religion and mosques of this type of religiosity through mullahs and some khaneqahs and takyas.
Conclusion
Generally speaking, in the Kurdistan Region, there is more than one type of Islam, and most types are influenced by types of Islam from other countries, due to the importation of Egyptian, Gulf, Turkish, etc., Islam.
National Islam is the product of the internal understanding of Kurdish society regarding the religion of Islam. Generally speaking, it manifests itself in the religious teaching of traditional mosque mullahs and these widespread thoughts and cultural opinions within society.
The discourse of these types of Islam mentioned in the first point continuously clashes with the discourse of national Islam. Most of the time, these discourses are under the influence of ideology and political games and conflicts.
Not only national and cultural Islam, but political Islam within itself continuously clashes, and political and religious conflict mixed together leads them to exclude each other from the sphere of religion.
Like political Islam, Salafi Islam, which continuously considers itself the true group within Islam, within itself this thinking continuously places them in intense conflict, and the discourse of mutual innovation (tabdi’) extends to mutual excommunication (takfir).
- Originally published in Publishing Sectionby the Center for Future Studies and translated by Nawroz Mohammed for Kfuture.Media.
