Karam Saeid*
Turkish-Russian relations have experienced noticeable tension recently due to disagreements over several contentious issues. This was evident when the Turkish government raised the issue of Crimea again on March 16, 2024, marking the 10th anniversary of Russia’s annexation of the peninsula. The Turkish Foreign Ministry reiterated its refusal to recognize Russia’s annexation, emphasizing Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, which provoked Russia. In response, Russia criticized these statements and called on Turkey to refrain from interfering in its internal affairs.
The disagreement was also visible on February 11 when the Kremlin announced the postponement of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Turkey. The postponement partly reflected Moscow’s discontent with Turkey’s shifting foreign policy direction, which has moved away from maintaining regional geopolitical balances. This shift suggests that tensions between the two countries may continue, especially after Turkey agreed to Sweden’s, and earlier Finland’s, NATO membership.
Key Drivers of the Tension
Several factors have contributed to the recent escalation of tension between Turkey and Russia, which can be outlined as follows:
- Turkey’s Rejection of Russia’s Actions in Ukraine:
Turkey opposes Russia’s stance on Crimea and its military actions in Ukraine, which angers Moscow. Turkey has voiced its opposition to the continued Russian occupation of Crimea and affirmed its commitment to monitoring developments in the peninsula while prioritizing the status of Crimean Tatars. Some assessments suggest that Ankara indirectly supports Islamic movements against Russian influence in Central Asia and provides financial support to the pro-Ukrainian faction of the Crimean Tatars.Despite Ankara’s attempts to mediate peace between Moscow and Kyiv, it has rejected Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine. Recently, Turkey has increased its calls for an end to the fighting and for the preservation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. - Approval of Sweden and Finland’s NATO Membership:
Tensions between Ankara and Moscow have risen since the Turkish parliament approved Sweden’s NATO membership request on January 24, following the earlier approval on March 31, 2023, for Finland’s accession. Turkey’s decision to support Sweden and Finland’s membership angered Moscow, which fears the deployment of NATO military units and infrastructure near its borders. Thus, Turkey’s policy shift regarding Sweden’s and Finland’s NATO membership has negatively impacted Turkish-Russian relations and may lead to further confrontation.According to Russian assessments, Turkey’s approval of Sweden’s membership did not consider Moscow’s strategic interests, as the integration of Sweden and Finland into NATO poses a direct threat to Russian national security by enabling the alliance to approach its borders and neutralize parts of its military capabilities, such as the Baltic Fleet. - Turkey’s Closer Ties with the West:
Relations between Turkey and Western countries opposed to Russia have significantly improved recently. The rapprochement between Ankara and Washington was highlighted by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to the U.S. on March 7-8 to attend meetings of the Turkish-American Strategic Mechanism, established during a meeting between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and U.S. President Joe Biden at the G20 summit in Rome in 2021.Defense relations between Ankara and Washington have also advanced, following the U.S. Congress’s approval of a deal for advanced F-16 fighter jets for Turkey and the lifting of restrictions imposed on Turkey’s defense industries during Donald Trump’s presidency under the “Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.”Additionally, Russian concerns escalated after Turkey officially joined the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI), led by Germany, on February 16. Launched by Berlin in 2022 amid the Ukrainian crisis, this initiative aims to establish a comprehensive missile defense system to protect Europe from Russian threats. - Freezing Russian Accounts:
Turkish banks have closed Russian companies’ accounts and tightened requirements for Russian citizens seeking bank cards in Turkey. This shift is linked to Turkey’s desire to improve relations with Western countries and reduce friction, especially after a U.S. presidential decree on December 22, 2023, allowing the Treasury Department to take measures against foreign banks facilitating transactions for sanctioned Russian entities or providing materials to Russia’s military-industrial complex. Turkey’s compliance with U.S. demands to join secondary sanctions against Russia can be seen in these bank account closures.Russian companies often use Turkey as a transit hub for payments and shipments, particularly in oil and gas trade, which has faced export difficulties due to Western sanctions. Restrictions on Turkish banking services for Russian citizens have also negatively impacted trade and investment between the two countries. - Increasing Defense Cooperation with Kyiv:
The tension between Ankara and Moscow is also linked to the growing defense cooperation between Turkey and Ukraine. Turkish company Baykar Makina plans to complete the construction of a drone factory in Ukraine by 2025, intending to use Ukrainian AI-322F engines to produce high-speed Bayraktar Kızılelma drones. Russia expressed concern about this military collaboration, with Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov warning on August 9, 2022, that if a Turkish drone factory is established in Ukraine, the Russian military would destroy it as part of its disarmament efforts. - Moscow’s Obstruction of Turkish-Syrian Normalization:
Although Russia has sponsored meetings at various levels between Turkey and Syria over the past three years to normalize relations, a shift in Moscow’s stance became evident ahead of the 21st round of the Astana peace talks on January 26. Russia asserted that Turkey’s insistence on remaining in Syrian territory obstructs normalization efforts. Russian Presidential Envoy to Syria Alexander Lavrentiev stated that Turkey’s presence “hinders normalization between the two countries.” Turkish analysts suggest that Russia’s stricter stance toward Turkish-Syrian rapprochement is linked to Ankara’s perceived pivot toward the West and its abandonment of a neutral position on the Ukrainian crisis. - Intensifying Competition in External Issues:
Part of the tension between Moscow and Ankara is due to each side’s efforts to contain and counter the other’s presence in shared areas of influence. Turkey has sought to capitalize on Russia’s preoccupation with the Ukrainian war to strengthen its role in the Caucasus, particularly in Turkic-speaking republics, and to expand its presence in Syria. Conversely, Russia has worked to compete with Turkish influence in Libya and West Africa.
Potential Repercussions
Given the escalating tensions, there could be significant repercussions for Russian-Turkish relations, primarily widening the rift between Moscow and Ankara. While Turkey is expected to continue opposing Russian military interventions in Ukraine, evident in its banking measures against Russia, Moscow may counter by obstructing potential Turkish military operations in northern Syria against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), especially since Russian forces cover the Kurdish People’s Protection Units in areas like Manbij and Tel Rifaat.
Additionally, Russia is unlikely to support calls from Turkish President Erdoğan, who, during his meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on March 8, called for a peace summit between Moscow and Kyiv, with Ankara as a mediator.
Russia may also seek to use its gas supplies as leverage over Turkey, as the latter relies on Russia for about 70% of its gas needs. Tensions could also jeopardize some joint projects, such as the Russian gas hub in Turkey, which Moscow aims to use as a platform for supplying other countries, including European nations.
In conclusion, despite the growing disputes between Moscow and Ankara on various regional issues, this does not necessarily mean a complete breakdown in relations. The two countries may seek to limit their disagreements and redefine their relationship based on pragmatic interests, given the massive economic ties, with trade reaching approximately $62 billion, and ongoing efforts to increase it to $100 billion.
*Researcher specializing in Turkish affairs – Democracy Journal, Al-Ahram Foundation
This article, originally authored by (Karam Saeid) and published in Arabic by ACPSS, has been translated by Mohammed Ali for Kfuture.Media.