The regime of Bashar al-Assad and the Ba’ath Party in Syria collapsed on December 8, 2024, after more than half a century of ruling and directing Syrian society with an iron fist. Bashar al-Assad fled to Moscow by plane. Ahmad Sharaa, the head of the Syrian Liberation Council, became the interim head of the post-Assad Syrian Administration and later introduced himself as the president of Syria. The dynamics of the conflict, the balance of power, and the nature of the conflicts are changing, with political and military actors confronting each other in different ways. This new phase of Syria involves international, regional, and local forces playing roles in designing and shaping the political and diplomatic system and reorganizing its society. Each will participate in this ethno-religious and political dynamic in post-Assad Syria according to the size of their power and hegemony.

Iran’s hegemony has completely collapsed and weakened since the fall of Assad! Questions and speculation arise about whether Iran can return. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Assad regime became an ally of the Islamic Republic of Iran because both had three main enemies: Israel, Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party in Iraq, and the United States. These three common enemies made both Iranian and Syrian actors strategic allies, and part of the regional system was designed and built around them. Iran and Syria became strategic allies in 1980 and signed a cooperation treaty, especially military cooperation to fight the Israeli army in Lebanon, while simultaneously opposing the Iraqi Ba’athist regime. Although the Syrian Ba’ath Party shared the same ideology as the Iraqi Ba’ath Party, religious identity separated them and brought Syria closer to Iran. Thus, they remained allies until the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. In the Shiite Crescent project, Syria was the strategic depth of the project and a main route—a sensitive artery of Iran’s geopolitical strategy and geopolitics connecting Tehran to Beirut. This built a kind of strategic depth for Iran within the Shiite Crescent framework.

Iran after the 1979 Revolution

After the Islamic Revolution, the country’s political, social, and cultural system was modified and restructured. A new relationship between citizens and political power emerged in Iran. A system based on the Shiite sect and the jurisprudential state emerged, with clerics becoming politicians, decision-makers, and political planners. Although the Iranian revolution did not establish a democratic system based on human rights, citizenship, and civil governance, it rebuilt another authoritarian system. Unlike Latin America, Central and Southern Europe, and several African countries where the relative collapse of dictatorship led to democratic and open systems, Iran took a different path. In addition, the political elite that overthrew the monarchy in Iran and changed the basis of governance in the country developed a religious strategy to direct and manage Iran’s domestic and foreign policy. Based on this, they determined the idea and strategy of exporting the revolution, which became the main agenda and basic interface of the political system. Later, the Shiite Crescent project was built upon it. Generally, after the 1979 revolution, Iran worked at regional and even international levels to ensure that Shiites, as a force, religion, and political player, were in a stage of attack, revival, and awakening. They could no longer remain in the stage of defense, immobility, mourning, and self-restraint as in the past. Iran wanted to lead this revival itself as the center of the movement.

The Shiite Crescent Project

The Shiite Crescent is a geopolitical concept and phrase that expresses several different meanings. In short, this term expresses the Iranian-religious desire to expand geographically and geopolitically, become a regional power, and play a role in the regional system—or at least formulate and manage some of the values in the system and the rules of the game. After 2003, the terms and projects of the Shiite Crescent have been mentioned, but the period after the fall of the Ba’ath regime and the rise of the Arab Spring demonstrations paved the way for further movement and implementation of the Shiite Crescent project. The project’s number one goal is to connect Syria, Lebanon, and the Golan Heights to Tehran through both Syria and Iraq. Tehran wants to build a land bridge through the Shiite Crescent Project to construct a new geopolitical unit for the Shiite world led and polarized by Iran. Although the world’s Shiites make up only 10% of the global population, mostly concentrated in Iran and neighboring countries such as Iraq, and their religious culture is centered in these two countries, after 1979, Iran has tried to formulate new leadership for Shiite society, gather them, and play a unifying role in order to enter a better stage of revival, hegemony, decision-making, and supremacy.

The Shiite Crescent as a term and phrase was first used by King Abdullah II of Jordan as a reference to the symbol and hegemony of Iran and Shiites in the Middle East. After that, in 2005, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister spoke of the dangers of the Shiite Crescent project, while Hosni Mubarak, the then President of Egypt, said Shiites in Arab countries were more loyal to Iran than to the countries they lived in, citing as an example Iran’s influence on Iraqi Shiites, who make up 65% of the country’s population. All these statements, understandings, and views show that Sunni countries see the Shiite Crescent as a dangerous geopolitical-religious path for their position, hegemony, security, politics, governance, and the regional system itself.

The Position and Strategic Objectives of the Shiite Crescent Project for Iran

After the 1979 revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been trying to become a regional power, playing the role of the former Safavid empire, taking advantage of its historical and geographical depth, and acting as the number one actor in the regional political system. To achieve this goal, the Shiite Crescent can help and benefit Iran in the following ways:

1. Iran needs proxy agents to conduct its wars and become the owner of the majority of forces. It has to find a way geographically to deliver military aid and assistance. The Shiite Crescent Project, which creates a land corridor, could become a bridge to deliver Tehran’s military assistance to its agents as peripheral powers, because the cost of this land route is economically cheaper than air routes.
2. The project has challenged the United States and its allies over the past 20 years, as they have constantly confronted Iran and its agents through economic sanctions.
3. Through this geopolitical project, Iran is trying to create threats to regional rivals such as Saudi Arabia and Israel in terms of security, economy, diplomacy, foreign policy, geopolitics, and political geography.
4. Although the Shiite Crescent Project had military goals and rigid authority, Iran was trying to spread the soft power of Shiites through the dissemination of Shiite culture, Shiite sect, stories, narratives, and religious heritage.

Iran and the Resistance Front

The Resistance Front refers to the armed and militia network run by Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq. They are directly under Iranian command, policy, and strategy. This front has organized itself as a military and armed obstacle to the policy and hegemony of the United States and its allies in the Middle East, constantly acting as an opposing force, fighting and managing conflicts.

After the fall of the Ba’ath authority and Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003, Iran quickly established strong ties with the then Shiite government and later with Shiite armed groups in Iraq, rapidly linking them to the resistance front. In 2014, the front played an active role in defeating ISIS and completely consolidated its economic, religious, and even cultural hegemony in the country. In Syria, Iran also turned Assad’s army into another ring of the network, followed by Lebanese Hezbollah, Palestinian Hamas, and the Yemeni Houthis, until the front grew into a Shiite armed bloc and a non-state actor opposing state actors. They were carrying out missile attacks on the Kurdistan Regional Government’s capital, Erbil. Iran provided them with logistical, arms, weapons, and ammunition support, further encouraging them to confront and weaken their opponents.

Yemen: Another Pool of Domino Theory

Yemen, its capital, and the Houthis, as a ring of the resistance front, were bombed by Israel and its allies for a while, but were less visible due to the dynamics of the Syrian situation and unfolding events in the Middle East. What Israel is doing is cutting off all the rings of the resistance front, defeating the Shiite Crescent project, and isolating them from each other. Israel mainly follows a policy of divide and rule. Obviously, dividing makes it easier to dominate the opponent. This time, Israel is working to destroy the constant forces of the Shiite Crescent bloc.

Constant forces (history, geography, population, culture) versus variable forces (economic, military, and technological) represent different disciplines of the power structure. This attempt by the United States and Israel to break the depth of Iran’s strategy abroad is designed to force it to remain within itself and not engage in territorial expansion. Obviously, this project works to prevent Iran from becoming a dominant regional and geopolitical actor, instead making it a fenced and wingless actor without nuclear weapons—but without thinking about the collapse or change of regime, because Iran is a complex ethno-religious and ideological unit within itself. The pressure and attacks are designed to weaken it geopolitically, geoeconomically, and geoculturally! At least, it cannot emerge in the long run and disrupt the security and system of the region. After Sanaa, Iraq will be another field, pool, and ring of these strategies and unfolding events. As a result, post-Assad Iran will not be able to play the same role as pre-Assad Iran.

The Identity of Power and State in Post-Assad Syria

One of the primary facets of the current Syrian governance structure indicates the dominant hegemony of the Republic of Turkey over the Syrian political elite and society. The power shift represents an expression of power and hegemony moving from the center of the Iranian project to Turkish power and hegemony. Syria is caught between two forces and regional projects! Previously, a Shiite minority directed the identity of the Syrian state and society, but this time a Sunni majority is reshaping society, politics, and governance.

Some of the figures in the current Syrian government were educated in Turkey, lived in Turkey, and are engaged in politics. This dynamic change of power easily marginalizes and limits the Kurds, fragmenting their potential and interests. Both regional projects are religious in appearance but nationalist and ethno-centric in content and depth. They often act in the form of religious nationalism.

Changing principles of the regional system in the Middle East can also modify geopolitics, the balance of power, roles, and the identity and structure of states. Earlier, there was talk of scenarios of partitioning Syria, federalism, and political decentralization. Today, there is talk of a centralized Syria and a unitary state with concentrated power and sovereignty. Changing power always rapidly changes the politics of identity and the relationship between state-society and state-state. In general, the picture can be presented as a highly variable political dynamic in post-Assad Syria, but there are two stable negative signs for the Western Kurds in the post-Assad period:

First, the strategy of the international community, especially the European Union and the United States, has changed regarding the status of the West, and they openly believe that Kurds must lay down arms and become part of the Syrian military institution without any preconditions, demands, or requirements.

Second, political power in the new Syria will be restructured on the basis of centralization and will not include any form of federal status or division of powers. Instead of fragmentation, powers are re-concentrated in a strong center to govern everyone. Obviously, both indications jeopardize the status of the Western Kurds in terms of security, existence, identity, society, and relations. For more than 100 years, the Middle East has been governed and organized by this story and paradigm.

A strong, centralized state and a weak society represent the identity of the state-society relationship in our region. It is a model that both the colonial powers and the political elite in the region use to protect their interests. On the other hand, the Sunni model of power in Syria through a character like Ahmad Shara completely ends the dominance of the Shiite project, because Syria played the role of a link in this Iranian project and conveyed Iranian Shiite power from the Arabian Gulf to the Mediterranean through the Shiite Crescent.

The Post-Assad Period and Its Effects

Soon after the regime change in Syria, a high-level US State Department delegation began talks with Ahmad Shara (Abu Mohammed al-Jolani) in Damascus about the future of Syria. The Syrian Liberation Council and its leader, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, are on the US terror list and there is even a $10 million reward for his capture.

The dynamics of international relations are based on higher interests. What is considered terrorist yesterday and today can become a friend tomorrow if it adapts to the main values, orders, and balance of the system. The international community, especially the United States, has been focusing on a concept for the future of Syria since day one: [Comprehensive Political Process]. The basis of this concept is political pluralism and the participation of all in policymaking, legislation, and governance, especially during the transition period.

As a post-colonial country and post-war society, Syria has little subjective opportunity to achieve a comprehensive political process. What is expected as a scenario is more like the model of Libya and Iraq, which are far from democratic transition, political development, and institutional and civil state building. Syria, as a geopolitical entity, is intensely focused upon, but it is not a different example of governance, power building, domestic policy, and democratic development. However, in terms of foreign policy, there is no hope for the return of Iranian hegemony in Syria and friendly relations between the current Syria and Iran, because the values, policies, ideologies, and principles of governance of the two states are fundamentally opposed.

At the same time, the fall of the Ba’ath regime and Assad’s flight from Syria represented the fall of Russia and Iran in the region! Russia has been trying to return to the world stage and the international political system since 2008 in Georgia, then through Syria and the case of Ukraine. After 2003, Iran has tried to make its project successful through Iraq and Syria and become an influential regional actor with decisive power.

Syria is close to water and sea, and Syria’s geopolitical dynamics would serve Iran’s and Russia’s foreign policy and its return to the world stage. The fall of Syria represents a paradigm shift and conflict—it is the shrinkage and retreat of Iran and the Russians. The balance of power in international relations is always changing. If your strength doesn’t change today, it will change and fall tomorrow. The balance of post-Assad Iranian power shows weakening, retreating, and declining.

One of the gaps in global governance is the lack of a written constitution. Global governance is shaped by an unwritten constitution, and this gap has made it easy for forces and actors to clash. Power must take the form of dynamism and be constantly moving and changing.

The case of Syria is the best example of world governance. For more than a decade, Syria has been full of state and non-state actors. Regional and international actors, each according to their geopolitical situation, strategy, and interests, present themselves in the Syrian arena and impose their values.

Today, Assad and his regime have lost that dynamic of power, and their system, values, and regional and international support are collapsing. Here, other forces are coming forward with new political geography and ideology. Geopolitically, Syria is the first Arab country to overlook the Mediterranean Sea in the Middle East to the west and neighbors Iraq to the east, serving as the northern gateway to the Arab world. It is bordered by Turkey from the north and Lebanon and Israel from the south.

Each of these neighbors has a different and contradictory position and identity within the regional system. This dynamic of division of power, interests, and identities further transforms Syria into a complex and eventful entity. At the very least, Syria can no longer return to its borders and sovereignty and see the phenomenon of the state as the owner of institutions, communications, and a monopoly of legitimate violence.

The Reconstruction of Syria: Opposing Forces and Hegemonies

The theoretical dealings and positions of the international community with Syria so far, in theory, protect the borders, sovereignty, the rights of communities, respect for diversity and pluralism, security, the unification of the army, and the dynamics of Syrian society. This framework is conceptually sound, but it requires implementation from top to bottom in society and the development of the environment, culture, institutions, and social energy.

Regionally, after the shift in the paradigm of power and the retreat of the Shiite Crescent project, both Turkish and Israeli projects are struggling to influence Syria. Both forces and actors have unchangeable and variable types of power in Syria and have the ability to mobilize. Turkey has geopolitical and military presence in northern Syria, while Israel maintains influence in the south.

Turkey’s project is based on neo-Ottomanism and a return to the Ottoman state system, while Israel’s project is more about linking Syria to the Greater Israel project. Syrian minorities are present at two important geopolitical gates in Syria: Alawites in western Syria and the Mediterranean coast as a coastal strip, and the Druze in southern Syria near Israel. Both minorities could be facilitated by the current regime’s two regional projects (Turkey and Israel) as non-state actors in the event of threats.

Presumably, due to local, regional, and global factors, the transition to democracy in Syria is challenging and, at best, will not be better than the cases of Iraq and Lebanon. Power and hegemony in Syria are divided, with different ideologies, conflicting interests, and different actors. The framework of conflict and opposing directions makes the potential for mobilization and unification of forces, institution building, sovereignty, and security extremely difficult. Syria is a country of various religions, sects, and ethnicities, and peace, security, and statehood are not easily established. Although Shiite dominance in the new Syria has ended, it is not easy for Iran to earn the same role and position in it as before.

Conclusion

After the fall of the regime of Bashar al-Assad, the Islamic Republic of Iran faces many geopolitical and political challenges, threats, and obstacles at both domestic and foreign policy levels. After a long period of rule, management, and oppression, the Assad regime collapsed despite the support of both Russia as an international power and Iran as a regional power. This destruction also affects Iran, its hegemony, foreign policy, and the Shiite Crescent project, which has been in place for more than 20 years.

In short, the fall of Assad and the rise of Sunnis to power in Syria through a figure like Ahmad Shara carries several messages and indications for politics, governance, and conflicts in the region. First: the political map of the Middle East will be redesigned under the leadership of Israel and its allies, with Israel playing a primary role and Turkey playing a significant role in this new map. Second: Iran will be a diminished actor after Assad, or at least its decisions and influence will be limited. It cannot be a major player in the regional system as it was during Assad’s era. The geopolitical project of the Shiite Crescent has been broken, and the resistance front and its agents have been weakened and targeted. Above all, it has lost its access to the sea through Syria, thus moving from the offensive to the defensive, withdrawing into its interior, and losing its identity as a regional power.

Meanwhile, Iran’s history after Assad and 2024 shows that it is more concerned with its internal problems and focuses more on its nuclear project than on foreign policy, using it as a tool of pressure and survival rather than for regional policy and strengthening its front. This is especially true after Donald Trump’s return to the White House and becoming president for a second term, because Trump’s policy is direct, quick, and decisive. It is against Iran and its agents, deals with Middle Eastern issues realistically and pragmatically, and does not believe in long-term diplomacy and patient negotiations. This does not serve Iran’s foreign policy and threatens Iran’s policies and projects, especially in post-Assad Syria.

• Originally published in Research Section by the Center for Future Studies and translated by Nawroz Mohammed for Kfuture.Media.