This article sheds light on the views and position of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the peace process between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). It is important to understand what Iran’s concerns or satisfactions are regarding this process. Does Iran support it or oppose it? If it has concerns, what are these concerns based on? If it supports it, why?

The Peace Process: Why?

An important process called the peace and resolution process, which followed the PKK’s announcement of laying down arms under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan, is underway. This is certainly a complex, multi-faceted process that is subject to debate. It has many critics and supporters. At the Kurdish level, some view it as the failure of the Kurdish liberation movement and struggle, while others, who are more supporters of the PKK, make excuses for it. Some define it as a peace process and others as Kurdish surrender. However, the prevailing voice is that immediately, at the domestic level of Turkey, the Kurds of the north and west, party and government officials in the Kurdistan Region, Iraq and the countries of the region, and at the international level, welcomed the initiation of the process. Of course, Erdogan and his party claimed from the beginning that they themselves were the owners of it.

This is not the first time that Turkey and the PKK have made peace. This is at least the third time that a peace process between Kurds and Turks has been underway in Turkey. The previous two times ended in failure. The first time, after the arrest of the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, this group announced a unilateral ceasefire in 2002. The then leaders of the PKK ended the party’s activities and immediately formed a new organization called the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress, which was supposed to continue resistance at the political level. A year later, the name of the organization was changed again, and in 2004 the PKK officially announced the breaking of the ceasefire and the resumption of armed struggle.

The second time was when the Justice and Development Party obtained an absolute majority of votes in the 2007 elections and formed a government alone. From that time, a series of solutions such as relative freedoms like the publication of Kurdish newspapers, magazines and books, the establishment of a television channel called TRT Kurdish, allowing education in Kurdish, projects such as democratic opening and emptying the mountains and returning to society were put on the agenda. Talks began in Oslo in 2009. However, the first project of the second round of talks also failed. In December 2012, secret dialogue between the state and Öcalan was revealed. However, in July 2013, the killing of Sakine Cansız, Fidan Doğan and Leyla Şaylemez shook the foundations and disrupted the process, and in 2015 the complete failure of the process was announced. In the second process, in 2011, Professor Naser Entesar said that the peace process between Turkey and the PKK surprised Iran. He said: “It is clear that Iran did not anticipate this situation. Therefore, it can be said that Iran was completely caught off guard.”

It appears that Iran has also been caught off guard in this current peace and resolution process. To the extent that apart from a formal statement by Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no clear Iranian position regarding the peace process can be seen. This current process is different. On December 27, 2025, Öcalan’s important message was read. The difference was not only in the demands of the message, but also in the change of circumstances. Also, the reasons for the change in circumstances. The most important reasons and needs of this current peace process for both sides can be summarized as follows:

– At Turkey’s domestic level, Erdogan and his party’s fear of not obtaining the necessary votes for the presidency this time and the need for self-preservation, which cannot achieve this need without obtaining the votes of the northern Kurds. Also, with this step, he can weaken the opposition front led by the CHP and prevent it from forming a new alliance with the Kurds.

– Turkey’s fear of the project to change and redraw the new map of the Middle East under Israeli leadership to encircle Anatolia.

– At the regional level, following Iran’s failure to protect Bashar al-Assad and his regime, an opportunity arose for Turkey to control Syria. The current situation in Syria requires that through this agreement and new peace process, the Kurds of Rojava be weakened.

– Turkey’s fear of Israeli cooperation with Kurds in all four parts of Kurdistan.

– Also, despair that it could end Rojava Kurdistan without the consent of America and the West.

– At the international level, Turkey can take a step closer to European Union membership and closer rapprochement with NATO through this peace.

– On the other hand, just as can be read in Abdullah Öcalan’s messages, the PKK has reached an ideological dead end and cannot reproduce itself. Especially as reference is made to the emergence of another generation of urban and political activists in northern Kurdistan who have less belief in separatism, including Selahattin Demirtaş.

Considering all these factors and reasons above, it can be concluded that for both sides, and especially for Turkey, this process is a process of necessity.

Iran’s Perspective on the Peace Process

Every process and project, especially in these four states where part of Kurdistan’s territory is distributed among them, affects other states. Therefore, the peace process in Turkey can be a source of concern or satisfaction for Iranians. Below, we refer to the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran from three perspectives: Iran’s field/proxies and diplomacy, where the proxies also fall into the field category.

It should not be forgotten beforehand that Iran’s policy, media language, and decisions are not limited to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but rather Iran’s position can be sought in the field. The field means the scope of activities of the Revolutionary Guards, which has dominated Iranian diplomacy from the time of Ahmadinejad to this moment. Therefore, Iran’s position toward the peace process must be evaluated from both perspectives. Iran, in its only official position and according to the foreign policy report of IRNA, through Ismail Baghaei, who represents Iran’s “diplomacy,” announced: “The Islamic Republic of Iran supports any process that leads to stopping terrorism and strengthening security in Turkey and hopes that this change will have a positive impact at the regional level as well.” However, in the field, no Iranian position has been revealed. With this silence, Iran’s field concerns can be estimated.

The third perspective for understanding Iran’s policy consists of proxies. Iran in the field sometimes conveys its message and position regarding events through its proxies. For example, immediately after Erdogan’s emergence and support for the peace process, in a current on the social network X, Qais al-Khazali, Secretary-General of the Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq group, regarding the PKK’s laying down of arms, announced: “There is no longer any excuse for Turkey’s military presence in Iraq,” and requested Iraq and Parliament to take urgent measures for the complete withdrawal of Turkish armed forces. Ali al-Bandawi, a member of the Security and Defense Commission of the Iraqi Parliament, also said after the announcement of the PKK’s laying down of arms: “Despite laying down arms, Turkey has still not withdrawn its forces, and Iraq awaits Turkey’s army withdrawal because there is no excuse left.” From the position of the proxies, it appears that Iran had no preparation for the peace process, and after becoming aware of the process, it seeks to find how it can benefit from the situation in order to rhetorically approach that event.

What Does Iran Want?

To answer this question, there is no alternative but to search through Iranian media and announcements to understand Iran’s concerns and position. The articles and speeches that have been published about this process have emphasized three main points through which Iran wants to somehow reproduce its discourse or not lose ground:

First, the pressure from Iraqi forces to remove Turkish forces from Iraqi soil, especially the Dohuk areas. Iran sees this agreement as an opportunity to pressure Iraq through its proxies to force Turkish forces to return to their own borders.

Second, emphasizing the point that Turkey is ultimately unreliable and implements a double-standard policy toward the Kurds. In several articles, it has been mentioned that Turkey has never been trustworthy. On one hand, it commits genocide against the Kurds in Rojava and even appoints trustees to Kurdish cities in northern Kurdistan and deprives them of their basic rights, and on the other hand, it periodically initiates a process called the peace process.

Third, what Erdogan is doing is merely a plan for his own survival and his ability to nominate himself again for another term through drafting a new constitution, which can only be achieved by obtaining the votes of Kurds within the Turkish Parliament. Iran’s effort to minimize the process and remind that this process has been initiated several times before and ended without results. The fact that they have not made official statements about this is noteworthy. Either through official state channels, they refer to Erdogan’s double-standard policy. For example, the Iranian Student Journalists Club website, in an article taken from Sky News international correspondent, refers to Turkey’s dual policy toward Syrian Kurds on one hand and successive attacks against them on the other hand, and writes that it is unclear how real this change in Turkey’s perspective is or whether it is aimed at achieving gains. One of the gains is Erdogan’s opportunity to nominate himself again for the presidential election in 2028, which is impossible according to the current constitution, because he needs the 45 seats of the Kurds to conduct early elections.

Fourth, emphasizing the futility of four decades of bloody war between the PKK and Turkey and the failure of the Kurdish liberation movement. The best evidence is Öcalan’s admission that the PKK has lost its meaning and must dissolve. Tasnim News Agency’s emphasis on the fact that Öcalan no longer wants federation, autonomy, independence, and not even administrative independence, and acknowledgment that these demands are the result of the futile practices of an extremist nationalist movement, and that such foundations do not answer today’s questions.

Fifth, emphasizing the continuous divisions and dualities between the PKK leadership among themselves and Kurds in general. Also, that the Kurdish struggle did not begin with Öcalan to end with his surrender. Additionally, magnifying the differences of opinion and decisions of the Kurdish triangle, which consists of Abdullah Öcalan, the northern political forces, and Qandil. For example, emphasizing the statements of officials like Cemil Bayik when he refers to Qandil’s demands in contrast to their commitment to the decisions and demands of the PKK leader. Also, what Öcalan says does not necessarily require Qandil to be bound by it.

These doubt-creating efforts have, of course, in the past led Turkey to consider Iran as one of the causes of the failure of successive peace processes in Turkey. Therefore, sometimes it escalated to war and mutual denunciatory statements, and Turkey blamed Iran, while Iran rejected it in every way. Even Turkey’s accusation that Iran uses the PKK for its own interests and expansionist policy in the region. Turkey also refers to the relationship between Iran and the PKK. For example, just recently, Hakan Fidan criticized the meeting between Iranian military officials and Mazloum Kobani in a statement and asked Iran not to support Syrian Kurds, especially the YPG.

The sixth and final point, which is directly related to Iran’s concerns, is Iran’s suspicion about connecting PKK members with PJAK and uniting them and then inciting them to oppose the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Conclusion

According to the references mentioned above, the Islamic Republic of Iran has only once officially supported and welcomed the new announcement of peace between the PKK and Turkey. It appears that, like the second peace process, this time it has also been outside the circle and views the situation with surprise. Therefore, only through media close to fundamentalists or the position of proxies can we understand Iran’s hidden position. In this agreement, Iran only wants not to be completely empty-handed and to have some kind of gain in the results of the agreement. We can say the most important points that Iran emphasizes are: through proxies, it pressures Iraq to remove Turkish forces from their country, because the excuse for their stay no longer exists. A kind of casting doubt on Erdogan and Turkey’s good intentions toward Kurds in general and using them to extend his presidency and become a member of the European Union, and reflecting a kind of Iranian concerns about connecting PKK forces with Kurdish forces in the east. Also, Iran’s fear of Turkey becoming stronger, because one of the outcomes of these agreements is opening more doors to Turkey so that it can compete more strongly in the region than before without disturbing any Kurdish force. Finally, Turkey with these steps may be able to protect itself from the storm of regional changes and the new map of the Middle East.

• Originally published in Iran Studies  by the Center for Future Studies and translated by Nawroz Mohammed for Kfuture.Media.

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