Zirak Ahmad Rahman

Humans have been familiar with clothing and body coverings since ancient times, both for the purpose of physical protection and for preserving identity. Clothing and attire encompass anything that covers the human body in a general sense [1]. Perhaps in ancient times, clothing fulfilled only these two aforementioned purposes. However, with the advancement of humanity and the differentiation of societies both internally and externally, clothing came under other influences, acquiring distinct identities.

Clothing falls under the category of material culture, like any other material item that humans use [2]. Nevertheless, since culture varies from one society to another, this material element of culture is also influenced by non-material identity as a cultural value, affected by religion, beliefs, internal perspectives, etc.

This holds true for any society to varying degrees, and Kurdish society, with its vast expanse, is an inseparable part of these perspectives. Of course, when we discuss Kurdish society in this context, we primarily refer to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq from a political administrative perspective.

After language,national dress, defines the nation; Kurdish clothing defines the Kurdish nation, with a history dating back approximately three thousand years. This does not imply that throughout these three thousand years, all regions of Kurdistan had the same type of clothing in every era. Rather, what is referred to as Kurdish clothing varies from one region to another and has continuously undergone changes [3].

Clothing and Religious Groups in Kurdish Society

It is difficult for us to consider the entirety of Kurdish society as a single example in this discussion because we observe that this society encompasses diverse religions, sectarian, and ethnic components. However, if we set this aside and focus more on cities and towns in general, we can present a set of observations and notes. Regarding the influence of Islam and the religious strata and personalities in Kurdish society, they are mostly recognized by their distinctive attire.

In the past, along with wearing “kurtak” (short jackets), trousers, “rank” (a type of garment), and “chogha” (a type of overcoat) — which was a garment tailored to fit the man’s body fully and was open at the front but could be closed by a waistband — there was also the “salta,” which was like a thin jacket, open at the front with pockets. In the Erbil plain, elderly and privileged men wore it, especially those tribes who had come from Garmian and the Kirmashan region, such as the Lak and Kalhor[4]. Until modern times and the emergence of fashion, most mullahs (religious scholars) were identified by this attire, along with wearing a white turban. Similarly, the sheikhs of Sufism, particularly the Qadiris, wore “kawa” (a type of jacket) and “salta,” and most of them wore green waistbands as a reference to their lineage tracing back to the Prophet’s family [5]. Additionally, they wore cloaks (“aba”) over their shoulders.

From the 1970s, the attire of mullahs, especially in the cities of Sulaymaniyah and Erbil, had another style, which was wearing a “jubba” (robe) and a round turban. The jubba more closely resembles the attire of the Mamluk era. The circular wrapping of the turban has been common among Kurdish mullahs. However, some turban wrapping methods more closely resemble Indian turbans; this is because Iraq in the 1920s was influenced by Indian exchanges, as both were under British control. At the same time, wearing the Ottoman fez [6] remained as a tradition to a lesser or greater extent in central and southern Iraq. Among Kurds, as evidenced by remaining images and archives, figures such as M. Abdul Karim Mudarris, Sheikh al-Khal, M. Ala’eddin Sajjadi, and Sheikh Qaradaghi wore this type of fez. The fez is a cylindrical hat slightly longer than the ordinary Kurdish hat, with a tassel attached to the top.

Moreover, another religious distinction was evident in the dervish attire, characterized by their long hair under hats and headscarves, as well as daggers and “zarg” (a type of long pin or skewer like a spindle, with one sharp end and the other end fitted with a wooden ball secured with nails into the leather [7]) tucked into their waistbands, and long prayer beads around their necks. By these distinctions, dervishes were recognized by their attire.

Regarding women’s clothes, like men’s attire, in general each region has its own set of distinctive characteristics. Based on available archival images, Kurdish women generally wore partial head coverings, and in some regions, they wore “houri” turbans, but generally, their bangs and locks of hair were visible. With advancing age, the garments changed and became less colorful and varied. Additionally, women, after the death of a close person, especially men, often wore black continuously. For going outside, only in major cities like Erbil and Kirkuk did women wear the “aba” (cloak). Similar to men, women who went on the Hajj pilgrimage used yellow “kashida” (a type of fabric) as turbans. Besides what has been mentioned, there were no other religious or ideological indicators in women’s clothing.

Kurdish Clothing and Ideological Appearance

In the 1940s, with the establishment of the Republic of Kurdistan in Mahabad, a minor alteration in Kurdish clothing emerged due to the influence of Western attire, specifically the adoption of neckties with traditional Kurdish men’s clothing. Subsequently, this style became recognized as “democratic clothing” in Kurdistan, and even some personalities such as the poet Piramerd, the poet Dildar, Mam Jalal, and other figures wore it [8]. This attire carries two ideological dimensions: one represents the display of modernism, intellectualism, and differentiation from the older generation; the other dimension, due to its popularity in Mahabad, embodies a nationalist manifestation, symbolizing the ideals of independence and republicanism for Kurds. However, this ideologically influenced model has virtually disappeared among Kurds except for very rare individuals. In comparison, the red scarf (jamana) as a symbol of Barzan culture has remained as symbolic attire with spiritual value among members of the Kurdistan Democratic Party. Additionally, in recent years, several styles of men’s clothing have become models named after political figures, particularly leaders of the ruling parties, due to party supporters adopting these styles and patterns that were not previously part of traditional Kurdish attire.

Furthermore, regarding the issue of promoting hijab, neither the early Ikhwan nor their current counterparts can deny that the strongest dimension of hijab is political, aimed at being influential rather than influenced! Moreover, this movement has consistently described those who oppose hijab as submissive, lacking honor, and inferior [9]. This political dimension has more impact on tribal and underdeveloped communities; sometimes, instead of the ideology influencing society intellectually, the outward appearance has a greater impact on society. For example, if we observe the hijab worn by the former Parliament Speaker and her secretary, it is as strict as that of Islamist parliamentarians, yet from a non-Islamic headquarters and against the political interests of the Islamists.

Kurdish Clothing and Ikhwan

In the early stages of political Islamic movements, neither the clerics within this trend nor the officials and supporters showed significant distinctions except for maintaining beards. The Islamic Union, as a continuation of the line that sees itself as the legitimate heir of Ikhwan, has clothing styles and appearances more similar to the Egyptian Ikhwan. This is characterized by wearing jackets, trousers, and neckties while maintaining a thin beard. This appearance is evident from the Secretary-General to the majority of their cadres [10], similar to Ikhwan in Egypt, Tunisia’s Ennahda, Morocco, etc. Very rarely do individuals at the upper echelons of the Islamic Union appear in Kurdish attire, except for isolated cases. This style of jackets, trousers, and neckties is known in some places as formal or Western attire. Most appearances of Sayyid Qutb, Ikhwan leader, were like this, as were many images of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of Ikhwan.

Regarding the attire of the Islamic Union’s clerics, from the early 1990s, due to some well-known Islamic Union clerics, instead of wrapping white turbans, the red fez with wrapped turban gradually became popular [11]. While the fez has more of a Turkish Ottoman appearance, its adoption by the Egyptian Ikhwan symbolized the political Islamic movement’s aspiration to restore the fallen Ottoman Caliphate. Therefore, the fez spread as a symbol of pro-caliphate sentiment within the Group. However, this reached Kurdish Ikhwan clerics secondhand, and this style of Ikhwan turban became a model. This was later common among Turkish clerics as well, as part of an old traditional heritage, and it became more prevalent here, especially among Kurdish clerics and preachers influenced by Turkey’s Justice and Development Party.

Concerning women’s clothing, in the early 1990s and the Islamic awakening movement in Kurdistan, the simple robe (juba) and fully closed headscarf became an Islamic model. However, this has continuously been influenced by hijab styles from other countries. Later, Iranian mantles, influenced by Persian films dubbed into Kurdish, became another model among veiled women [12]. After the Iranian model, due to rising influence and remaining in power, the hijab style of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party entered the market and spread among women of this movement, particularly visible in the “Golden Crown” ceremonies [13] and displays of newly veiled girls, where this style is quite apparent.

The Islamic Movement

What we mean by this is the first generation of the jihadi Islamic Movement in its old version, the movement that encompassed all of today’s Islamists, including each of the Islamic Group, the Islamic Movement, the Islamic Relations Movement, Ansar, and other breakaway factions.

Regarding the clothing style of clerics in this orientation, Mullah Osman Abdul Aziz consistently appeared with a traditional Kurdish clerical turban and a black Arab cloak (aba). He typically wore this cloak over a clerical jacket and “salta” (a type of vest) or over a dishdasha (a traditional Arab robe), and sometimes over Kurdish clothing [14]. After his removal from the leadership of the movement and the succession of his brother Mullah Ali, the latter also primarily appeared with this turban and black cloak, but more frequently appeared in dishdasha and Kurdish clothing. As an interpretation of these garments, the jacket and salta were traditional attire for elderly Kurdish men, mullahs, and sheikhs, as Mullah Osman wore them with a white waistband. This style of clothing has generally declined among Kurds and did not become popular like the attire of Sayyid Qutb and Hassan al-Banna. Similarly, like some Kurdish mullahs wearing dishdasha and clerical jackets, this was already common, and that personality simply followed the tradition. Therefore, we can say that it did not become a charisma with cultural influence. However, simultaneously, we observe some distinct clothing appearances within this movement. For example, in the early emergence of armed political Islam, wearing military vests over Kurdish clothing was recognized as a characteristic of Islamists. The vest was more military in style, with many pockets inside and outside; as an Islamic feature, there was a place for a miswak (traditional teeth-cleaning twig) on the chest pocket, with the head of the miswak visible. This appearance consistently identified this Islamic line. Meanwhile, others in the movement at that time, like Mullah Krekar, introduced another model into the movement’s clothing, which was the Afghan cap [15]. Some fighters and supporters of the movement, influenced by the then-ongoing war of jihadist fighters against the Soviet Union and the Afghan government, particularly in the 1990s, adopted this style. Notably, only a few supporters of the movement wore formal attire, jacket and trousers, and if they wore them outside Kurdistan, they did not wear neckties. This can be interpreted in two ways: firstly, the movement was a force under the influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which considers Western attire both Western and Christian. Secondly, directly apart from Iranian understanding, some preachers of political and Salafi share the same view on neckties as the Shiite jurists of the Islamic Republic.

Concerning women’s clothing, this orientation was stricter than Ikhwan, both in terms of size and color; their clothing was more closed [16]. Even a significant part of this movement’s women wore and wear abayas over their hijab. The tradition of wearing abaya over hijab became more common after the Islamic Revolution in Iran within the field of political Islam. Furthermore, this movement, until the separation of its various components and different opinions, had minimal presence and appearance of women both in media and political work, movements, and activities.

The Salafists

As for the Salafists, although their activity in Kurdistan dates back to the early 1960s, they did not have much influence on the political and social landscape of Kurdish society. Their influence became more apparent after the 2000s, especially when a Salafi movement known as Madkhali was promoted in some Islamic countries as a movement subservient to authorities and aimed at weakening and diminishing Islamists. In any case, the difference between Salafists and Islamists in terms of clothing is that Salafists generally appear less in dishdasha and Arab clothing; Salafists generally wear Kurdish clothing, but they are recognizable from afar because they typically wear rolled turbans, and their beards are long and untrimmed, even if their beards are very uneven or varied in length. They also generally have short mustaches along with their long beards, and all of them have short trouser legs. As they indicate, they consider this obligatory as a practice of the Prophet, and not doing so leads to being considered sinful [17]. In this regard, their clerics generally follow this style, and occasionally they appear with dishdasha, abaya, and Gulf-style headwear (ghitra), especially their Quran reciters and prayer leaders. Sometimes they also appear with Kurdish turban-scarf and Arab dishdasha, but this is less common. In terms of clothing, Salafi clerics and individual Salafis share these described clothing styles; generally, if a Salafi cleric is not well-known, it is difficult to identify the cleric among a group of Salafis.

Regarding Salafi women, what is common in Kurdistan is that initially, they, like the women of the Movement, appeared more with abayas, but in recent years, the vast majority of women from Salafi families appear with niqab (face veil). This became particularly prevalent after the influx of Iraqi Sunni Arab refugees during the years of Iraq’s sectarian war.

Kurdistan Justice Group (Komal)

This party, as the heir of the Islamic movement and comprising various structures, has influence on the attire of its supporters. Generally, the leader of the Kurdistan Justice Group (Komal) always appears in Kurdish clothing, in a style that to some extent emerges as his own distinctive model. Its leader’s Kurdish clothing is more catafi-style, sometimes with a zipper similar to the clothing style of the Kurdistan Democratic Party leader. Additionally, he typically wears his belt tied in knots. Some experts of social culture trace this knotted belt style back to the Zoroastrian era; however, it seems unlikely that there is a connection between Mr. Ali Bapir and this ancient religious heritage. Furthermore, he consistently appears with a traditional Kurdish turban that more closely resembles that of elderly mullahs, along with a moderate face and beard. Generally, this type of clothing is common among most members and cadres of the Community, with the majority appearing in this manner. Some also appear in formal attire—some due to the influence of the prohibition of neckties or the hegemonic influence of Iran—while others more closely resemble Hamas officials with beards and formal attire.

Since the Community includes a Salafi movement line, these individuals more closely resemble other Salafists in terms of clothing. Perhaps it would not be an exaggeration to say they are barely distinguishable from them—in terms of appearance, turban style, and short pants.

This diversity of thought within the Community also influences the women of this party. Thus, one can observe within the Komal women wearing Turkish-style hijab, who are more influenced by the Ikhwan line within the party; Iranian manteau wearers, who are more under the influence of Persian and Iranian literature, and to some extent Iranian politics; and those who are the heirs of the former movement, who are more modest and abaya-wearers, along with an increase in niqab-wearers among the supporters of this party. Of course, due to the influence of the Sunni Arab refugee tradition following the ISIS war and the increased media promotion of the niqab, the phenomenon of niqab-wearing has also affected this party, especially the line influenced by jihadist thought and Salafists within the party.

Modeling the Arab Clothing

This refers to clothing items that together or individually display Arab characteristics. Due to the large number of Arab and Syrian refugees, as well as the significant influence of frequent Umrah pilgrimages, in Kurdistan during Ramadan or Fridays, especially in summer, religious people wear dishdasha. Many of those who go on Hajj and Umrah immediately wear this clothing there, whether because the local climate demands it, through imitation, or to be perceived as religious. Of course, if the issue were climate, then this clothing would only be worn in summer.

Another piece of Arab clothing is the wearing of the ghutrah, or Arab-style turban. This is mostly worn by some mullahs, preachers, and Quran reciters, clearly influenced by Gulf Arabs. Some also wear a black abaya with it, just like Gulf Arabs. This style is adopted by some mullahs influenced by their clothing style. Additionally, wearing Emirati and Yemeni headwraps is another model of Kurdish religiosity, especially among young people—some even wear it with Kurdish clothing, particularly those influenced by jihadists, as this style of head covering was more common among al-Qaeda and ISIS. Due to this cultural influence, both during the Hajj and Umrah seasons and through media influence, there are also Pakistani and Afghan clothing styles in the Arab clothing markets of Kurdistan. However, this style, like the dishdasha, is worn in Saudi Arabia due to the presence of a large population belonging to this culture.

Niqab

Although there were various pieces of headwear in the past—headscarves, headcovers, turbans, charogha, chador, face veils, and pecha—what is currently sold in hijab markets and worn by some women is called “pecha” in Kurdish literature. It is a thin black woven piece that women hold over their mouth and eyes when going outside. However, a common phenomenon among Kurdish religious individuals influenced by political Islam and Salafism is always using Arabic terminology for religious concepts. This phenomenon has reached a point where one cannot use the Kurdish word for God; only “Allah” must be used. In any case, the niqab phenomenon is the newest trend among religious currents influenced by Salafism and external political Islam. This phenomenon was initially more common among Arabs in Sunni areas and was very unfamiliar in the Kurdistan Region. However, following the massive influx of Sunni Arabs, this phenomenon became more visible. Additionally, with the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and the imposition of this phenomenon on women, it became more normalized in terms of visual acceptance. With the rise of Salafists, this became an opportunity for this phenomenon to increase in Kurdistan. Currently, many women from Salafist families wear the face veil, across all Salafist orientations. This has also significantly influenced Islamists; for example, due to the influence of these trends, this phenomenon is on the rise within the Kurdistan Justice Group (Komal). As for the Islamic Movement, while this party is increasingly weak and declining, it has benefited from this phenomenon by sending a niqab-wearing parliamentarian, whom they call the first niqab parliamentarian in Kurdistan, taking advantage of the United Islamic Party’s withdrawal from the process. However, in the last Kurdistan Parliament election (October 2024), they once again nominated the same parliamentarian with the same title and a Gulf-style niqab in the Halabja district, exploiting the women’s quota system, but were unsuccessful. This phenomenon has two aspects: first, capitalizing on the wave of niqab adoption; second, associating with the external political Islamic world, particularly the Sunnis of Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, as well as  presenting themselves as such. Additionally, these few women from the party consistently describe their opponents as naked, irreligious, and loose. In other words, they aim to make this style of appearance the identity of Kurdish women while benefiting from its political dimension.

Conclusion:

While the importance of clothing and attire lies in protecting the human body from both cold and heat, as well as preserving individual characteristics, it simultaneously carries cultural and national identity and is influenced by ideology. Religious currents in some religions, sects, and denominations carry national identity at the same time, often, a subordinate nation following the religion of a dominant nation places its national identity at the service of the dominant nation’s identity, under the pretext of the sacredness of the religious message. In the Kurdistan Region, clothing carries not only ideological and party identity but sometimes even the identity of famous political figures, becoming models and styles of clothing design, especially for men. Ideological currents, through their supporters, promote styles and models of clothing and appearance as their visual manifestation in Kurdish society. Of course, this comes at the expense of the national culture and indigenous religious culture prevalent among the people. Neighboring countries, through their like-minded supporters in the Kurdistan Region, are continuously importing their specific culture. Internally, whether consciously or unconsciously, service is provided to this external agenda to erase the internal national culture. Clothing and attire that carry ideological identity always cause societal individuals to be divided into different strata, due to the self-differentiation of wearers of these clothes and adherents to these styles of appearance, etc., especially if the style is not originated from the society itself.

• Originally published in Religious Studies by the Center for Future Studies and translated by Nawroz Mohammed for Kfuture.Media.

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