By; Arman Husseini

The discussion of the overthrow (toppling) or disintegration (collapse) of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s authority is one of the important and simultaneously complex topics within Iran’s internal and external opposition. This topic has become a source of division among various factions to such an extent that the manner and form of transition from this authority largely determines the structure and content of Iran’s future government. A significant portion of political experts and specialists believe that if the Islamic Republic were to be overthrown, the chances for Kurds and other subjugated nations of Iran would increase substantially to obtain their share, to the extent that they could even determine their own destiny. This is because during the overthrow process, the power structure would largely dissolve, and security, intelligence, and military infrastructures would disappear. Consequently, a vacuum would be created in which Kurds, Baloch, Arabs, Turkmen, and others could emerge as powerful actors in the future political transformation game. However, in the scenario of the Islamic Republic’s disintegration, the remnants of central government power might provide a solid foundation for the re-establishment of a government that would be a continuation of the successive central governments of at least the past hundred years in that country.

According to the experience of Iran’s nation-state, the Persians, through their democrats and monarchists, as one of the nations within Iran’s geography, have endeavored in recent years to work on disintegration rather than overthrow as a strategic project for maintaining and extending their rule. For instance, this type of transition from Qajar authority to Pahlavi, and from Pahlavi to the Islamic Republic, has been experienced in such a way that the remnants of each collapsed government became the foundation for the re-establishment of a new authority. However, in contrast, subjugated nations, above all the Kurds, have taken the opposite step to the centralists, so that the process of transition from central authority ends not in disintegration but in overthrow. This means that the foundations and structures of power, from economic to cultural, would be shattered. It is in this situation that a power vacuum is created, and the reconstruction of new authority requires the consent and participation of nations and religious minorities. The Kurdish role is particularly important in this regard because they possess extensive experience in resistance, organization, and organizational culture, which can be transferred and become the foundation for Iran’s constituent structures. The result of this situation is the formation of a significant and influential structure for the future, which to a large extent loses the function of centralization around the Persian nation. Therefore, it can be said that the main struggle for Iran’s future consists of the confrontation between two roadmaps of overthrow or disintegration of authority in that country. Additionally, external factors and forces will have direct influence on the factions carrying these two strategies. This influence can drive either of these two strategies toward strengthening or weakening.

Considering Iran’s 1979 revolution, the danger is very serious that a totalitarian government might once again seize power. This in itself turns the prospects of democratization, power distribution, and social, cultural, and national justice toward great threat, which also encompasses the sparks of surrounding countries and the region. Therefore, there is currently intense debate on this matter. In this article, we attempt to discuss the differences between the essential points of disintegration and overthrow. We also aim to clarify, by bringing up examples and statements from prominent and famous personalities, how the process and course of transition from the Islamic Republic can have profound and lasting effects on the national structures and religious minorities inside Iran and neighboring countries.

1. Scenarios for Iran’s Future

Here we will explore four scenarios that we believe constitute the main scenarios for the future of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s authority. According to the definition given at the beginning regarding the disintegration or overthrow of authority in Iran, each scenario or assumption can end, according to its influential factors, in its own particular way, either in disintegration or overthrow. In other words, it is the process of the authority’s demise that determines the political future.

1.1 First Scenario: Military Coup

The Islamic Republic has more than 16 parallel security institutions (1). Therefore, previously many experts and specialists believed that due to this large and comprehensive network, the possibility of a military coup in Iran was not very strong (1). However, recently, due to the weakening of the Quds Force’s position (the external branch of the Revolutionary Guards), which is responsible for exporting the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic’s interference in the affairs of regional countries, as well as the destabilization of the closed circle of power (Khamenei and his entourage), which is reflected in President Pezeshkian and Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s Foreign Minister, discussing negotiations with the West after Israel and America’s attacks on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear sites, and Saeed Jalili’s opposition as a prominent figure within the hardliner circle, as well as senior commanders of the Revolutionary Guards, this possibility has become stronger and is considered one of the strong scenarios. A glance at the Soviet Union’s demise process reveals the reality that the weakening of external hegemonic position is the beginning of internal position weakening, because it has a profound impact directly on the political-ideological hegemony of power. This course in the Soviet Union was such that the territory of power was reduced to within the borders of present-day Russia, and gradually the creation of different countries weakened the force and legitimacy of the Communist Party ideology, leading to Gorbachev’s reforms and the end of that authority’s lifespan.

After Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack on Israel, which documents later proved was carried out on Khamenei’s orders (2), a campaign was initiated by Israel with American support, which led to the striking of Hamas, Hezbollah, and other proxies belonging to the Islamic Republic, and ultimately resulted in the retreat of the sphere of influence or Tehran’s reach in the region. To experts, this was in a way a repetition of the Soviet Union’s fate. Therefore, at present, it can be said that at least in terms of power and authority, the Revolutionary Guards as the main pillar of the Islamic Republic have been weakened. This retreat has created a major crack within the Revolutionary Guards’ structure, to the extent that a portion believes they must continue interventions in the region even if the cost of this intervention is direct confrontation with Israel. On the other hand, another portion believes they must return internally and abandon previous policies. This is important in that during a crisis period, it can pave the way for a coup by one faction over power within the government, especially if there is foreign support. Therefore, currently part of the centrist opposition is seeking to attract the attention of some Revolutionary Guards officers to itself. This effort is so serious that the son of Iran’s former Shah (Reza Pahlavi) has openly discussed in several statements that members of that armed force (army) should fall under the command of forgiveness (3). In September 2023, Amir Taheri, who is known as one of the prominent monarchists, said in an interview with Channel One: The era when the Brigade (remnants of the Qajar government’s military force) targeted the parliament with artillery, the constitutionalists, without considering this act a terrorist action, decided to retire the commander of that force, Vladimir Liakhov, and send him to his country, namely Russia, and Reza Khan established a new government army with the remnants of that force. Therefore, at present too, the Revolutionary Guards should not be dissolved, besieged, or designated as terrorists. This is while some democrats consider this statement and position dangerous for the future of democracy and stability. Furthermore, some of those reformists who have been abandoned by Khamenei might take concrete steps toward a military coup in cooperation with a wing of the army. In both cases, a military coup, especially if there is external backing, would most likely lead to the disintegration of the Islamic Republic’s authority. This means that part of the economic, military, and political system, with some minor changes, would remain as they are, and this would entirely serve the interests of a faction that strategically supports disintegration. This faction can, with the help of remnants of the previous government, establish its authority, which without doubt will be a vengeful, arbitrary, and violent authority toward the people, especially subjugated nations like the Kurds.

1.2 Scenario of External Attack

External attack is one of the possibilities that could lead to the sudden demise or at least weakening of Tehran’s authority. This scenario was stronger after America’s attack on Iraq and Afghanistan; later, due to American public opinion dissatisfaction, high financial costs, and the killing of several thousand soldiers, it was abandoned as a serious option. However, before the 2015 nuclear agreement between the P5+1 countries and Iran (JCPOA), Barack Obama, the then-President of the United States, warned that if the Islamic Republic was not prepared to negotiate with the P5+1 countries, the option of military attack would be implemented. Also, at present, concurrent with meetings between the Islamic Republic of Iran and America, Donald Trump, the President of America, threatens that if Tehran does not accept Washington’s demands and attempts to produce nuclear weapons, he will issue an attack order against Tehran, as we have seen how, in coordination with Israel, they targeted the atomic sites of Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan and, according to President Trump’s statement, destroyed them. Furthermore, the state of Israel, because it considers Iran a serious threat to its survival, tries to prepare itself for a military confrontation. Although Tel Aviv prefers Iran to be controlled through a solid agreement, because the Islamic Republic has persistently threatened Israel’s annihilation, they do not consider any agreement as a permanent guarantee. Therefore, in their defense doctrine, they continue to maintain military attack as an available option. In the event of an attack by Israel or America and its allies, we have two main scenarios, which we discuss here.

First, an attack similar to the First Gulf War, which completely weakened the Iraqi Ba’ath government’s authority. In that attack, a hard blow was struck to Iraq’s economic, intelligence, and military infrastructures. As a result of this weakening of Ba’ath authority, an opportunity presented itself for Southern Kurdistan as a major constituent of that country, and through a popular uprising, a significant portion of Southern Kurdistan’s land was liberated from Ba’ath control, which later became the political, geographic, and social entity currently known as the Kurdistan Region.

Second, an attack similar to America’s military hammer in Afghanistan, which occurred in 2001. In this attack, the entire system and power structure was targeted at once and dissolved, and a new authority was established in that country with American support, although this new government of Afghanistan remained fragile until its collapse. This was because the authority was more a product of American will and Pentagon engineering than rooted in the popular will of that country. Although this in itself is debatable, our purpose here is the outcome of the military attack that led to the overthrow of Afghanistan’s then-authority.

In the event of either of these two situations occurring in Iran, different paths would open before the people. Although this is largely tied to America’s goals and plans, the power structure and grounds for change in Iran will have their own specific impact. In any case, in the event of an attack, two major nations that possess parties and organizations, such as the Kurds and Baloch, can be two main allies and supporters for the attacking country. This is because these two nations possess organization and armed forces. This capability, as we saw in Southern Kurdistan in 1991, can determine the type of future authority. Undoubtedly, this scenario is not a desirable option for the Persian nation, as the dominant identity of modern Iran, because it would certainly lead to power distribution and the breaking of Tehran’s power monopoly. Therefore, supporters of central authority, who are mostly Persians, are against military attack and prefer a type of power handover in Tehran that would maintain their hegemony and dominance as the ruling nation rather than having it overthrown and losing power or being caught in an internal war. Therefore, the preferred and good option for Persians as part of the Islamic Republic’s opposition, especially Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s former Shah, is the disintegration of authority, not overthrow, and they openly desire controlled disintegration (4).

1.3 Scenario of Popular Uprising

Because totalitarian governments create a large surveillance network over their institutions and citizens, they can largely prevent the formation of social movements and organizations, and it is said that in the past century, the demise of all totalitarian governments has occurred either through external attack or disintegration. That is, the masses have not been able to overthrow these authorities, such as the Soviet Union, which suffered disintegration, as well as the former Taliban authority, which disappeared as a result of external attack. If we assume that the Islamic Republic of Iran is also a totalitarian government, then according to the theory, this government can withstand popular upheavals. The existence of organization and social movement, although on paper cannot directly cause the demise of totalitarian authority, can create great pressure and early preparation for citizens to be able, in the event of a major crack forming within the power structure or any other factor, to create major change in the direction they desire, even if that change is not a Revolution.

For example, the (Woman, Life, Freedom) movement, which occurred in 2022 in most cities and areas of Iran, largely questioned the legitimacy of authority and, by relying on its main slogan (Woman, Life, Freedom), embodied values opposing the authority’s established values throughout different areas of Iran. This was a beginning for forcing the authority to retreat from the mandatory hijab trench, and we currently see that in the streets of most major cities, women go out in clothing of their choice. Even women who wear head coverings support other women in their own way and consider the absence of hijab an inalienable right. Although this step does not immediately and directly create the danger of overthrow for the authority, it creates a kind of self-confidence, sense of interconnection, and unity among the popular masses. This in itself is considered a threat for a totalitarian government that seeks to atomize and separate citizens. It can also pave the way for deepening internal conflict and consequently the disintegration of authority. In other words, a wing of authority that desires to suppress citizens’ demands conflicts intensely with another wing of authority that prefers reform and improvement, and this disrupts the management and governance system. Also, in some cases, as happened in Syria, the authority, despite being able to suppress a popular uprising that occurred in 2011, that very uprising became the cause of weakening and an internal war that, with external support, ended Assad’s authority within a few days. That is, several of these factors can come together or have their specific impact on the authority’s disintegration one after another.

2. Inefficiency and Internal Disintegration of Authority

According to the annual report of Transparency International for 2024, the Islamic Republic of Iran ranked 151st among 181 countries worldwide in terms of corruption and is still considered one of the most corrupt countries in the world (5). Also, according to the International Monetary Fund’s report, Iran’s economy in recent years has exceeded forty percent inflation. On the other hand, food inflation in 2022 and 2018 rose to forty-seven percent.

This can be an indicator of economic deterioration, which can be a beginning for the disintegration of the entire power structure. With the shrinking of the country’s economy and decrease in income, and consequently the decline in rent rates, internal conflict within the power circle deepens and confrontation increases. As we know, in the past year, reformists at the media level have taken a tougher stance than before against the hardliner current, because their participation rate in power was less than ever. Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, considers these kinds of statements as raising the green flag for countries hostile to the Islamic Republic and has often personally opposed them. This has become such that Khamenei has lost his previous influence as the regulator of internal power conflict and has emerged more as the leader of the hardliner wing, and this has resulted in reactions from people like Rafsanjani, the former President of the Islamic Republic, who suspiciously lost his life. The deepening of this conflict over the economic share and government can drive that authority toward sudden structural disintegration.

Conclusion

Currently, a portion of the people, especially the lower classes of society, which includes the majority of subjugated nations’ people, and as a result of systematic discriminatory policies and inflation by the Islamic Republic, suffer from difficult economic, political, and social conditions, desire the overthrow of authority, because only in that situation does a suitable opportunity arise for fundamental change in their lives. The Federal Congress of Iranian Nations, which is composed of a significant portion of parties and political factions of Iran’s non-Persian nations and, as a clear alternative, represents the will and demands of subjugated nations, in a statement calls on the oppressed people to not stop demonstrating and protesting until the complete overthrow of the Islamic Republic’s authority (6). According to the latest report by Mai Sato, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights in Iran, between 2010 and 2023, 49% of executed political prisoners in Iran were Kurdish, 29% Baloch, 16% Arab citizens, and 6% from other national minorities. Mai Sato says in another report that the execution rate according to Sharia has recorded its highest level since 2015 and onward compared to the past, to the extent that Iran’s authority has implemented the most Sharia executions. Also, according to the Hengaw Human Rights Organization, in the demonstrations of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, out of a total of 540 killed, 142 were Kurdish. Also during the Woman, Life, Freedom demonstrations, and in just one day on September 30, 2022, known as Bloody Friday of Zahedan, more than one hundred Baloch citizens were subjected to direct gunfire and lost their lives, and 300 were injured. This demonstrates the reality that subjugated nations are more present in the resistance arena and are suppressed in every way and sacrificed for the overthrow of that authority that violates their rights.

This is while Persian society as the dominant nation in major cities such as Tehran, Isfahan, Mashhad, and Qom did not participate as extensively in the demonstrations. An undeniable fact emerges here that the Persians, as the dominant nation carrying the authority’s identity, have had the least participation in those protests that were held for the purpose of overthrowing the authority. The main reason for Persians not participating in such protests, where demonstrators desire the government’s overthrow, returns to the fact that the foundation of Iran’s nation-state is established on the identity, interests, and dignity of Persians, and that authority considers itself their representative. Therefore, we see that when the Green Movement began in Tehran to protest the manner of Iran’s presidential election and later spread to other Persian cities like Isfahan, Mashhad, and Shiraz, the people of Kurdistan, Balochistan, and Arab Iran did not come to the streets and did not participate. The main reason returned to the demands of the demonstrators and leaders who desired reform. These protests ultimately became more widespread and many people became victims, but they still chanted slogans for the authority’s disintegration. Therefore, subjugated nations saw no kind of rights for themselves in the goals and slogans of that movement and decided not to mix with those demonstrations.

Just as people participate differently and in their own specific protests according to identity and social class, political factions carrying different discourses and demands also have their own specific agendas and programs for scenarios and events. For example, in Woman, Life, Freedom, the monarchists, who represent Persians particularly and the middle and upper classes of this nation, tried to change the slogans and stand against the intellectual foundations and goals of Kurds and other subjugated nations. For instance, they tried to change the movement’s main slogan of Jîna, which was Woman, Life, Freedom, and instead raised the meaningless phrase: Man, Homeland, Prosperity. They also took steps to disrupt the unity and direction of the revolution by spreading false information on social networks. In contrast, the Kurdish and Baloch opposition, and to some extent Gilaki, put all their energy into advancing this movement. The confrontation between these two political and ideological camps demonstrates the conflict between subjugated nations and the dominant nation.

This conflict between subjugated nations who desire the overthrow of central authority, and the demands of the opposition and Persian dissatisfaction with authority who desire disintegration, continues and has become an opportunity for the Islamic Republic to breathe. A scenario that has continuously existed and remains is external intervention and pressure, which can change the entirety of balances and calculations and place a new reality before the people and political factions.

• Originally published in Research Section by the Center for Future Studies and translated by Nawroz Mohammed for Kfuture.Media.