Written by: Ahmed Mohammed Fal | Al Jazeera Centre for Studies
Turkish and Iranian drones have played a major role in the Russia-Ukraine war on both sides of the conflict.
Turkish Bayraktar drones have provided Ukraine with the capability to strike Russian forces, and the Ukrainian army utilized them extensively at the outset of the war. Consequently, they became a symbol of Ukrainian resistance.
Simultaneously, Russia has been intensively employing Iranian Shahed drones and managed, in a single night last August, to bombard western Ukraine with 546 drones.
Russia has also established specialized airfields for mass launching of Shahed drones, through which it has inflicted substantial damage on Ukrainian forces and economic infrastructure.
We ask: What role do Turkish and Iranian weapons play in the tensions between Russia and the West? What are Turkey and Iran’s gains in this regard? What lies behind the rivalry between Ankara and Tehran in regional and global conflicts?
Bayraktar Halts Russian Advances
According to a report by the international website “The War Zone,” specialized in military affairs, published in early September of last year and prepared by researcher Howard Altman, the “Bayraktar TB2” aircraft is a medium-altitude, long-endurance drone that deploys precision-guided small munitions, capable of striking multiple targets in a single aerial sortie and returning after a break period to execute effective strikes against Russian forces.
The most recent of these strikes targeted a Russian boat off the Black Sea coast, which was engaged in troop transportation. On its official Telegram account, the Ukrainian naval forces announced that “a fast boat belonging to Russian naval forces was destroyed in the Black Sea while attempting to transport a unit to Tenderivska.”
Later in the article, the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence Directorate released a video several weeks ago showing another strike on a small Russian boat via the TB2 aircraft, but this time near the port of Zaliv in the Kherson region.
Last June, the Ukrainian naval forces displayed footage of a Bayraktar TB2 strike on a Russian landing craft off the western coast of Kherson.
According to The War Zone report, Bayraktar aircraft played a highly effective weapon role for the Ukrainians in the early days of the war, executing primary strike and reconnaissance missions and playing a crucial role in halting a massive Russian force advancing toward Kyiv.
Bayraktar aircraft assisted Ukraine in recapturing Snake Island in the western Black Sea by striking our targets from their positions on land and targeting vessels attempting to reach them.
This success of Turkish drones gave Ukraine a small glimmer of hope. This achievement also inspired Ukrainian artist Taras Borovok, who released a striking song about Bayraktar aircraft that energized Ukrainians and spread widely across internet networks.
According to researcher Altman, Ukraine began using Turkish drones before Russia’s full-scale invasion. The first strike from this aircraft series occurred in October 2021, targeting an artillery platform belonging to Russian-backed separatist forces in the Donbas region.
The Ukrainian newspaper “United 24” reported last June that “Russia has become accustomed to TB2 strikes and now counters them, which has caused the Ukrainian army to narrow its use of this aircraft, employing it only for reconnaissance, identifying probable strike targets, and determining weak defense areas.”
In a report, the newspaper “Ukraine Defence Express” considers the news of recent Bayraktar aircraft strikes on Russian forces to be of particular significance, indicating that Ukrainian defense forces have worked systematically to weaken the Russian air defense system, which means that Bayraktar aircraft have the capability to successfully deliver their strikes.
According to researcher Altman, there is an important factor that further encourages Ukraine to use the Bayraktar TB2 aircraft: its domestic production within Ukraine. Recently, Russia targeted a factory where Bayraktar aircraft were manufactured—this was the fourth strike in six months on the factory, in which tens of millions of dollars had been invested.
Shahed Strikes Fear into Ukrainian Hearts
According to an analysis by the American Center for Strategic and International Studies, the rate of Russian use of “Shahed” has increased from employing 200 per week in 2024 to more than a thousand aircraft per week in 2025.
According to a report by journalist Guillaume Mouret on France 24 network, titled “Russia Constructs Airfields and Specialized Economic Infrastructure for Using Iranian Shahed Drones Against Ukraine,” these aircraft, with ranges between 1,700 to 2,500 kilometers, are considered a primary threat to Ukrainians.
Although its speed is relatively low, reaching 180 kilometers per hour, the “Shahed” remains easier to deploy, as most can be launched from a cargo carrier or simple ground launch platform, even from an ordinary 4×4 vehicle.
According to journalist Mouret, Russia has been using “Shahed” drones against Ukraine since October 2022, benefiting from their low cost, considering ease of manufacture and intensive production capability, with costs estimated between $20,000 to $50,000 depending on each model’s specifications, while Russia spends between one to two million dollars manufacturing cruise missiles.
From early 2023, Russia began manufacturing “Shahed” drones on its territory in large quantities, naming them “Geran-2,” while retaining some Iranian components.
Journalist Mouret relates, through some Ukrainian citizens, their fear of the sound of Russian drones, which continuously fly over their country’s skies and become the cause of many deaths. One of them exclaimed: “When the aircraft flies over our city, I hear it from afar. Its loud sound resembles that emanating from a motorcycle after removing its muffler (timer).”
According to Mouret, Russian forces are attempting to intensify the use of “Shahed” drones to the point of exhaustion and weakening of Ukrainian missile defense while simultaneously terrorizing, such that there is no capacity to deal with the situation due to the massive number of attacking aircraft. This tactic allows Russia to map Ukraine’s air defense network in order to target it.
According to Mouret’s investigation, Russia is constructing new economic infrastructure for using Shahed drones. To date, Russia has revealed 11 locations along the border for deploying these aircraft.
The Tsymbalova base, which is the primary launch base for “Shahed” drones, is located near the city of Oryol, 170 kilometers northeast of Ukraine, and comprises eight ground launch platforms and a 2.8-kilometer road on military vehicles for launching drones. This location is capable of deploying 14 and approximately 100 drones simultaneously in one night.
The Iranian Shahed-136 aircraft is known to contain a warhead with 50 kilograms of explosives (Iranian media).
Turkey and the Difficult Balancing Process
Undoubtedly, the military success of Turkish Bayraktar aircraft on the Ukrainian battlefield causes Turkey to increase confidence in its technology, attract new buyers’ attention, and derive political benefit from this technology.
A previous study by researcher Sasha Mikelis, published by the Canadian site “RAS,” indicates that the Ukrainian armed forces’ cooperation with Turkey through provision of Bayraktar aircraft is not conclusive evidence of a military alliance between Ankara and Kyiv.
Researcher Mikelis believes that Ankara considers the balancing process necessary to ensure its alignment with the NATO alliance following tensions between itself and its Western allies for several reasons, one being Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 air defense missiles and purchase of Russian gas at discounted prices.
Turkey is working to achieve a difficult balancing process by gathering both sides: gaining NATO approval through providing Bayraktar drones to Ukraine, and second, Russian approval by refusing to fully implement sanctions imposed on the Kremlin by the West and continuing to provide its economic relations with Russia, which is considered the third largest trading partner with Turkey.
Researcher Mikelis views Turkish-Ukrainian coordination as a response to shared concerns between both sides regarding the anticipated Russian dominance of the Black Sea. The passage this sea provides for reaching the Mediterranean makes it a strategic issue, particularly the volume of hydrocarbons and exported agricultural products coming from neighboring countries and passing through it.
Ukraine and Russia are considered the largest exporters of grains, corn, and sunflower oil, and use the Black Sea to transport their exports.
Turkey, which derives various economic and political benefits through controlling both the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, feels anxious about Russia’s efforts to secure a gateway to “warm seas” (particularly the Mediterranean) by strengthening Russian influence in the Black Sea, according to the researcher himself.
According to Mikelis, strengthening coordination between Kyiv and Ankara participates in countering Russia’s objectives in the Black Sea, and Turkey’s presence on the Ukrainian field signals Turkey’s concern for the Crimean Tatars (Ukraine’s indigenous population).
Iran and Alliance with Russia
Historically, Iranian support has been associated with clear ideological proximity to Russia. Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, officials have become accustomed to this hostile international environment as an attack on their survival; this image reinforces intense hostility toward the West.
Providing drones to Russia by Iran gives assurance of a Russian alliance’s existence, distances it from isolation on the international stage, and evades Western sanctions aimed at stifling Iran’s economy.
Political analyst Blayon Nikivorov, in an article published on the Riddle site specialized in Russian affairs titled “Russia in the Middle East: Between Iranian Support and Turkish Rivalry,” believes that media portrayals often exaggerate discussion of a Russian-Iranian alliance’s existence, with many Western politicians and experts having contributed to establishing the imaginary image of this alliance.
The analyst believes the Russian side has deliberately given continuity to this image; for example, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov confirmed that the comprehensive strategic partnership agreement signed in January 2025 includes comprehensive coordination in security and defense affairs, while also displaying a large theatrical aspect.
Nikivorov discusses Russia’s self-defensive reaction regarding the 12-day war between Israel and Iran, believing that reaction was not due to the Kremlin’s preoccupation with its military preparations in Ukraine, but rather was the logical outcome of Russia’s policy in building alliances. Even during the pre-Ukraine period, Moscow could not provide more than symbolic support to Iran, merely as a “pat on the shoulder.”
Researcher Khan Kasaboglu believes the Russia-Ukraine war strengthened the military-industrial relationship between Moscow and Tehran, wherein Moscow provided technical assistance to Tehran in several key areas, including the space program, which could aid advancement of long-range ballistic missiles.
- Originally published in Publishing Section by the Center for Future Studies and translated by Nawroz Mohammed for Kfuture.Media.
