“Will America and Israel attack Iran again, and will war break out once more?” This is a simple yet fundamental and highly consequential question affecting the lives of the Iranian people and even the Islamic Republic system itself. It is a question that people frequently ask each other these days, whether in markets, bakery lines, or inside taxis, and one that is extensively discussed on social media and in the press. When a television host asked this question of Ali Akbar Salehi, the former foreign minister, he looked up at the ceiling, exhaled strangely, and said “Peace be upon you and God’s mercy”—a reaction that likely suggests the situation is so fragile and complex that he cannot rule out the possibility of war breaking out again.
How Would the Fire of War Ignite Again?
Naturally, at this moment, neither Iran’s leaders—and one could even say not even Donald Trump, the leader of the world’s most powerful country, who is himself a main party influencing whether or not war with Iran will occur again—have a precise answer to this question. However, it is possible to examine existing conditions, the perspectives and desires of influential actors, and the likely scenarios arising from these analyses.
The Snapback Mechanism: A New Pretext for War?
These days, various international, regional, and domestic conditions of the Islamic Republic of Iran present a very complicated situation in terms of security, political, economic, and even climatic dimensions. Simultaneously with the heating up of renewed war discussions, Iran’s climate has also become hot, and the government is struggling to manage the country’s energy imbalance through brief water and electricity cuts. Another issue is the time factor, which has also trapped Iran in difficult circumstances, as only 30 days remain until August 31st—the legal deadline for activating the “snapback mechanism.”
The snapback mechanism is one of the controversial agreements contained in clauses 36 and 37 of the JCPOA agreement in July 2015, according to which if one of the parties concludes that the other party (Iran) is not fulfilling its commitments, it can initiate the process for the return of UN sanctions without a new vote in the Security Council. In other words, with the activation of the snapback mechanism, all international sanctions mentioned in Security Council Resolution 2231 against Iran would be reimposed once again.
Europeans: The New Instigators of Battle
It appears that Iran’s various support for Russia in the war with Ukraine—which, according to Russian media claims, has been conducted through the sale of drones and missiles—has led to European anger and fury. They have transformed from mediators who for 22 years worked to reduce tension levels between Tehran and Washington into a hardline faction putting pressure on Iran. Officials from the three European countries—Britain, Germany, and France—have explicitly threatened in recent weeks and days that if Iran does not accept a new agreement, they will activate the snapback mechanism in 30 days.
Europe’s Hard and Heavy Preconditions
In this context, it seems that given the complex developments that have occurred, European countries are now pursuing conditions that go beyond monitoring Iran’s nuclear file and uranium enrichment issues—a matter that makes agreement difficult and complicates the path forward. In this regard, Jean-Noël Barrot, France’s Foreign Minister, said in an interview with CBS America: “However, since then, Iran has violated all the commitments it had accepted when signing this agreement. We now want a more comprehensive agreement that covers both the nuclear dimension of Iran’s destabilizing activities and the ballistic missile component, as well as the regional destabilizing activities that Iran has undertaken. If we do not reach a new, strong, durable, and verifiable agreement by the end of summer, France, Germany, and Britain will have no choice but to reimpose the global sanctions that were lifted 10 years ago when the nuclear agreement with Iran was signed.”
These statements by the French Foreign Minister appear to repeat the three demands of Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s Prime Minister. Three weeks ago, Netanyahu, in response to a question about under what circumstances he would not attack Iran again, said: “Israel has three basic conditions: first, complete cessation of uranium enrichment; second, complete cessation of Iran’s support for proxy groups (Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen, Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq, etc.); and third, reducing the range of Iran’s missiles and drones to under 300 kilometers.”
Meanwhile, Donald Trump, the President of the United States, at least in his interviews and particular gestures, no longer considers America eager to reach a quick and good agreement with Iran, although one should doubt his true intentions.
The Outlook Ahead
Now, considering these conditions and the terms set by Europeans and Israel, and Trump’s apparent reluctance to negotiate, we find that the situation for Iran is very complicated and complex, and this ceasefire after the 12-day war appears very fragile. It seems that opposing parties, who now see conditions for extracting more concessions from Iran and increasing pressure on it as better than ever before, are seeking to achieve their maximum demands.
If Europeans and America insist on these three demands, this means that Iran, in addition to making commitments to cease or significantly reduce support for its regional proxy groups, must also yield regarding uranium enrichment and accepting greater and more intense oversight of nuclear facilities. Perhaps in practice, one could say that the possibility of Iran showing flexibility regarding these two matters, given all the developments that have occurred in the past two years, might be feasible. However, regarding the third point—reducing its military capability by diminishing its missile and drone capacity—this appears to be a fundamental and highly strategic red line for Tehran, where the possibility of yielding and showing flexibility under current conditions and timing is very difficult and slim.
So Is War Inevitable?
Here, one must recall a reality in negotiation techniques: parties always try to present their maximum demands before negotiations begin in order to psychologically influence the opposing party before negotiations start, so they can practically give fewer concessions and gain more advantages.
Based on this, Iran emphasizes until serious new negotiations begin that its enrichment rights, military-missile capabilities, and regional relations are among its red lines and non-negotiable issues. On the other hand, European, American, and Israeli parties also consider all three matters as prerequisites for guaranteeing the non-activation of the snapback mechanism and preventing another war.
In this context, it is expected that during negotiations, each party will retreat from some of their conditions and demands and focus on their priorities. It should also not be forgotten that although Trump now shows himself reluctant toward negotiation and agreement with Iran, given his lack of success in creating peace between Russia and Ukraine, as well as between Israel and Palestine, he still needs a victory and success in the diplomatic arena. In this regard, no file seems more accessible to him than Iran’s file. Therefore, it must be said that with 30 days remaining until the snapback mechanism deadline, diplomacy still has a chance of success and preventing war—a war that, if it occurs again, will be much more consequential and have very different implications from the 12-day war.
