Israel’s military attack on Iranian territory in Khordad 1404 (May-June 2025) and Tehran’s reciprocal response represented one of the most tension-filled events in recent years in the West Asian region. However, alongside the military and geopolitical dimensions of this incident, the declared and hidden positions of regional actors themselves became a new arena for realigning coalitions and relationships. Among these, one of the unexpected stances came from Pakistan—a country that usually appears with a conservative policy toward Middle Eastern crises. This time, by issuing a relatively explicit statement, it spoke of “Iran’s right to legitimate defense,” and its official media also adopted a supportive tone toward Iran.
Pakistan, which had always taken a cautious stance regarding crises such as the Yemen war, the Syrian crisis, and even the suppression of Palestinians, why did it decide to take a relatively explicit position this time? Does this position signify the beginning of a strategic alliance with Iran, or is it merely a temporary reaction to regional security variables and balance considerations? This article seeks to demonstrate, by utilizing foreign policy analysis approaches and regional security considerations, that Islamabad’s recent action was a completely measured, conditional, and calculated move within the framework of national security logic, regional competition, and balance-oriented games. In other words, Pakistan sent a multilayered signal through this action: a message to Iran, a warning to India, a reminder to Saudi Arabia and America, and simultaneously an attempt to establish its position in the emerging Asian order that is distancing itself from traditional polarizations.
Examining the Causes and Motivations Behind Pakistan’s Supportive Position
As mentioned, Iran-Pakistan relations have always been subject to variables such as ideology, regional competition, relations with global powers, and domestic and trans-regional geopolitics. Although the Pahlavi era and the first decades after Pakistan’s independence were accompanied by strategic cooperation, particularly within the CENTO pact framework, after the 1979 revolution and with the expansion of sectarian rivalries in the region, a kind of strategic mistrust has emerged between the two countries at times. However, Pakistan’s support for Iran in the recent crisis with Israel has been unprecedented compared to previous positions—a position that goes beyond the clichéd, cautious, or neutral stances Islamabad has taken in Middle Eastern disputes. Accordingly, given the importance of historical developments, geopolitical and strategic logic, and security considerations, we examine the causes and contexts of this shift in Pakistan’s foreign policy.
1. Balancing Against Multilateral Threats
Although Pakistan was founded on an Islamic ideological basis, this country’s historical experience in foreign policy clearly shows that ideological principles, particularly in regional interactions, have remained merely slogans. Islamabad has not only avoided serious involvement in important crises such as the Syrian civil war, the Yemen blockade, and even regarding the Palestinian issue, but has often preferred to play the role of mediator or neutral observer. Therefore, the recent open support for Iran should not be analyzed as an Islamic ideological alliance, but rather should be understood as a crystallization of the security logic governing Pakistan’s foreign policy.
For Islamabad, instability in the east, particularly at shared borders with Iran, is synonymous with strengthening transnational threats, expanding terrorism, and weakening central control over Balochistan. Pakistan has bitter experience with power vacuums in Afghanistan: with Kabul’s fall, the flood of refugees, increased smuggling, and the expansion of armed groups quickly set Pakistan’s borders ablaze. Now, the same scenario could repeat if sovereignty collapses in the east (Iran). Therefore, Pakistan’s security institutions, including the army and intelligence organization (ISI), have concluded that Iran’s stability is important for regional stability.
However, this logic is not limited merely to border security. In the arena of regional balance, Pakistan has always sought to create a kind of balance of interests with China, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and even America. At the current juncture, Tehran, as one of the emerging poles in the Asian order, has become one of Islamabad’s geopolitical cards. In fact, Pakistan’s recent position can be considered part of a “multilateralization of geopolitical advantages” strategy—that is, creating balance among partners through signaling to key rivals.
Moreover, India’s role in this equation is very prominent. New Delhi is not only a military and intelligence partner for Israel, but also supported “Israel’s right to defense” in the recent crisis. In response, Islamabad, by taking a pro-Iran position, attempted to establish a diplomatic balance against India’s position. From this perspective, Pakistan’s message was more directed at India and Tel Aviv than at Iran: if you are building coalitions in our west, we too have leverage in your east. Furthermore, Pakistan’s recent position also carries an implicit political message to Saudi Arabia and America. Pakistan has faced severe financial pressures in recent years (particularly from FATF) on one hand, and reduced Saudi and American aid on the other. By adopting this position, Islamabad warns these powers that if they ignore its needs, it can lean toward alternative actors like Iran, China, or Russia.
2. The Military, Public Opinion, and Redefining Pakistan’s Position in the New Asian Order
The military’s role in Pakistan’s foreign policy has always been key. Particularly in files such as Afghanistan, China, and Iran, the army and intelligence apparatus operate beyond the official diplomatic apparatus. In the recent crisis, unexpected support for Iran was only possible when the military had a precise assessment of the strategic benefits of this action. From the military’s perspective, Iran is not only a barrier against excessive Israeli influence, but also an actor with control capabilities against separatist groups in Balochistan. Tehran and Islamabad’s intelligence cooperation, particularly in controlling difficult southeastern borders, has been vital for Pakistan’s army in recent years. Therefore, support for Iran, even if limited, carries a security message: Iran’s weakening means Pakistan’s internal security weakening.
In the domestic dimension, public opinion also played a decisive role. Pakistani society, particularly among religious and academic layers, has high sensitivity toward Israeli aggression. Religious parties, resistance groups, and even the young university body exerted significant political-media pressure on the government to adopt a clear position in support of Iran. Therefore, the official position can be understood as a combination of the army’s security-intelligence considerations and social pressure on the government.
On a broader level, this action is a sign of Pakistan’s attempt to redefine its role in the new Asian order. With changes in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy, Riyadh’s détente with Tehran, America’s reduced security commitments in the region, and the strengthening of the Iran-China-Russia axis, a new space has emerged for middle actors like Pakistan. In this transitional space, calculated support for Iran is an opportunity to upgrade Islamabad’s position as an effective actor in regional developments, not merely a function of Saudi or American policies.
Of course, it must be emphasized that this support, while important in symbolic dimensions, is not in practice deep, systematic, and long-term support. If external pressures increase—for example, in the form of sanctions, suspension of financial aid, or threats of isolation in international financial forums—Islamabad may quickly retreat from this position. Therefore, this position should be placed among short-term tactical signals, not the foundation of a lasting alliance.
Conclusion
Analysis of Pakistan’s supportive position toward Iran shows that this position is not merely the result of ideological sympathy or strategic transformation in Islamabad’s foreign policy, but rather the product of a combination of security necessities, public opinion pressure, regional competition with India, and geopolitical balancing. This support, on one hand, carried a warning message to Western powers, Israel, and India, and on the other hand, was an attempt to raise Pakistan’s bargaining capacity in the transitional structure of the Asian order.
In fact, this approach can be interpreted within the framework of Pakistan’s “new multilateralist strategies”—an approach that, on one hand, is inclined to benefit from the advantages of alliance with China, Iran, and Turkey, and on the other hand, does not want to sacrifice its vital relations with the West and Arab countries. Therefore, this support can both be the beginning of forming a kind of “tactical alignment” with Iran, and may also, if geopolitical calculations change, disappear as quickly as it came. Ultimately, this analysis shows that a correct understanding of Islamabad’s positions requires simultaneous attention to internal power logic, regional developments, and future studies in foreign policy.
