It is decided that Parliamentary elections will be held in Iraq on 11/11/2025. At this new juncture, the political map within the Shiite community is noteworthy, as the majority of seats and the position of Prime Minister are determined among the competing forces of this component, and they are the foundation of governance. This analysis examines the preparations of the Shiite community for the elections and the expected anticipated outcomes.
Statistics and Premises of the 2025 Elections
All elections in Iraq have their particular importance and significance, because theoretically in its constitution, the system of governance is republican-parliamentary-democratic [1]; this means that the government and executive authority must emerge from within that parliament which voters elect. Additionally, the electoral atmosphere falls under the influence of regional changes, and there is always some form of external factor presence. For the 2025 elections, for example, Assad’s fall in Syria, the retreat of Iranian influence, and the internal conflicts of the “Shiite Framework” have cast their shadow over the electoral atmosphere.
“Ammar al-Hakim,” who is one of the leaders of the Shiite Framework, called out in his speech on Eid al-Adha in the vibrant Iraqi dialect: “This upcoming election is fateful in Iraq’s history and is in your hands, because it is a founding stage.” [2] However, this may be more for encouraging Shiite participation and creating enthusiasm and is a kind of exaggeration, because while it’s true that the election is a factor for redistributing size and influence, there is no such indication available that radical change will follow or transform the general structure of governance.
According to the announced statistics of the Election Commission [3], the number of those who have the right to vote in Iraq for the November 2025 elections exceeds 29 million people [4]; this is twice the number of voters in the first post-“Saddam” election (2005) when the number of those who had the right was 1.4 million. Also, in this election, the number of parties has increased and reaches 343 registered parties with licenses, of which 118 parties have declared their desire to participate in the elections; so far, 60 parties are engaged in establishment and announcement procedures. Although according to the constitution (Article 49), every 100 thousand people in Iraq should have one seat representing them in parliament, according to the last amendment to the election law (third), the number of seats remains 329; 9 of them for quotas and 320 others for competition [5], while according to the latest statistics of Iraq’s population, the number of seats should have increased to 450 seats. Although the non-increase is justified by excessive costs and the complication of parliamentary work, which itself fundamentally has problems of effectiveness and disorder, it is still a form of non-compliance with the constitution, like some other articles.
Election Conditions and Atmosphere
In the 2025 elections, there are several influential events and conditions, the most important of which are the following:
– Within the Shiite center, “Sadr,” who portrays himself as an Iraqi leader and was the first bloc in the previous election (73 seats), will not participate and boycotts the process. For the boycott to be counted, they once instructed the Sadrist masses to renew their voter registration so that later when they boycotted, they would be counted as “non-participants”; this makes it more of a legal position and creates problems for the popular legitimacy of the process [6]. Also, in some mixed Shiite and Sunni areas, this boycott might benefit Sunni lists; even Sadr’s Shiite competitors who benefit from the withdrawal do not hide this concern [7].
– The elections come after the fall of the Syrian regime and the breaking of Iranian support in the Middle East; this has created some optimism in the Sunni center that it might lead to a retreat of Iranian influence and impact in Iraq [8]. This view stems from the fact that the political map of Shiites in this parliamentary session (fifth) has not been genuine and they have distributed Sadr’s seats among themselves, and also those pro-Iranian lists that were blocs did not have such achievement for their popular bases; this is apart from the fact that the prevailing atmosphere of the region is not in favor of the Iranian axis, and they no longer have their former magic.
Although these views are not very concrete regarding the Iraqi voter who looks more at domestic issues and the network of interests among the participating forces in power, they do have some credibility that is worth considering, especially how to fill Sadr’s void and the weakening of the pro-Iranian discourse and the financial and logistical problems of the axis in the shadow of the Trump administration and Israeli strikes.
– Shiite forces fear that foreign countries (they mean Sunnis) want to change the political map of Iraq’s future parliament through money pumping; among them, Turkey and Qatar stand out. One of those who realized this is “Nouri al-Maliki,” who emphasized that he has information that a country wants to buy 100 seats in the future parliament; for each parliamentarian, it pays one million dollars [9]. Although al-Maliki’s words might be to frighten the Shiite base, talk of buying and selling votes is hot from all sides and has worried some other Shiite leaders. In this context, several Shiite parliamentarians mention that in Baghdad the price of a voter card has reached 500 thousand dinars; in Mosul, from 75 thousand dinars to 300 thousand dinars buying and selling is done with it. Such rumors exist in other provinces too, but the commission denies the existence of such phenomena and promises to pursue them [10].
– Sadr, who boycotts the process himself, made the election more expensive for Shiites, because he issued a fatwa for his supporters to accept money and gifts from officials and candidates, but on the condition that they later do not vote for them and do not hand over their biometric cards. Sadr’s justification is that the money of candidates and lists belongs to the people, not to themselves, and it is not a favor [11]. This raises the possibility that part of the expenses and costs of Shiite forces will be wasted.
– Some Shiite parties warn that voter registration renewal in Sunni provinces is active and vigorous, while in the south and Shiite-inhabited areas it is weak and sluggish. In this, they cite commission data, because out of a total of 1.6 million voters who renewed their registration (biometric), most were from Anbar and western Iraq; in contrast, there was a significant retreat in Shiite-inhabited areas [12]. In general, the boycott rate of the process is very high. Some unofficial statistics from monitoring organizations mention that despite using various methods to encourage them, including mobile field teams and increasing 2007 births, yet by the end of May 2025, eight million voters out of a total of 29 million voters had not renewed their registration [13].
The weakness of voter registration renewal in the south might be read as Shiite voter dissatisfaction with the condition of their provinces; this is apart from the great pressure on the Iranian-connected Shiite political discourse. In contrast, the activity of Sunni areas is not far from the optimism and hopes that have emerged in the shadow of the new regional situation for improving their position. In this context, some Sunni politicians have mentioned that there is an opportunity to regain the position of Prime Minister, especially since their areas are calm and their area is large [14]. This brought a major Shiite counter-attack to defend that this position belongs only to the Shiite majority; not only because they are the majority “but because they shed blood for Iraq’s unity and liberation in Mosul, Anbar, and other areas.” [15]
Some voices heard among Shiites believe that Sunnis – especially from central Iraq areas – are eagerly renewing their biometrics in hope of regaining governance [16]. Although this could be a reason to encourage Shiites to go renew their registrations, it also reveals concerns about the balance of governance and fear of the consequences of Sadr’s boycott and the possibility of the balance being overturned.
Multiplicity and Unity of Shiite Lists
In the upcoming elections, the “Shiite Framework” will be temporarily scattered, except in Sunni provinces. The internal war of Shiites in the elections is essentially a redistribution of positions and the knot of prime ministership. Since the power map among Shiites is not always stable, there is potential for change and internal rises and falls in those segments that represent Shiites.
So far, initial indications are that the ruling “Shiite Framework” will be divided among a number of separate lists ranging between 10-16 lists [17]. What makes the competition between them hotter is the participation of dominant Shiite figures and personalities as list heads, especially since now the constituencies are at the provincial level and not 83 constituencies like the previous election. In a province like Baghdad, which is Iraq’s capital (10 million inhabitants), the number of seats is 69 seats along with 2 quota seats, which provides a large number and area for competition and efforts to collect votes.
This division of Shiite forces in Shiite provinces and their unity in Sunni and Kurdish-inhabited provinces is more of an electoral tactic, because the decision of Shiite forces is to reunite after the elections once again after the emergence of their popular weight and strength; because without that unity, they would face the danger of losing their position and their supporters, especially Iran and their voter street and surrounding circumstances all demand that unity.
The Most Important Competing Shiite Lists and Alliances
According to the information available so far, the most important Shiite lists and alliances participating in the 2025 elections are as follows:
Sudani’s “Development and Construction” Alliance:
This list belongs to the current Prime Minister, “Mohammed Shia al-Sudani.” From its name, it’s clear that he wants a second term by utilizing the services he has provided in Baghdad and other cities. Sudani’s descent as number one of this list in the capital has become a cause of annoyance for Shiite competitors.
The official participants in this alliance are: Sudani’s movement (al-Furatayn), Falih Fayyad’s alliance, head of the Hashd apparatus (al-Aqd al-Watani), Iyad Allawi’s coalition, former Prime Minister (al-Wataniya), and a number of other small tribal and civilian forces. The alliance’s goal has been defined as strengthening economic infrastructure, providing stability, and improving Iraq’s relations with the outside world [18], but the main effort is to secure another term for Sudani.
Several list speakers have mentioned that they will get around 100 seats. However, some see this as far-fetched, especially those components that currently do not have large popular support; considering that this is the government list, some put around 60-70 seats for them [19]. Some believe they will be much less because the components are small and not strong. In this, there is the experience of “Abadi,” who despite being the Prime Minister during the ISIS war, his results in the 2018 elections were disappointing. Despite this, the opposite possibility also exists because during Sudani’s time some visible projects have been built in Baghdad and surroundings, and the government list might have better chances than others.
Al-Maliki’s Alliance (State of Law):
The list of Nouri al-Maliki, former Prime Minister, is the current competitor for Sudani’s rising star. Its main components are nearly 10 Shiite entities, the most prominent being: the “Islamic Dawa Party” along with a group of other forces like “al-Nahj al-Watani” which is the Fadhila Party, “Muntasirun” of Abu Alaa al-Walai, head of the Iran-linked “Sayyid al-Shuhada Brigades,” “Bashair” of Yasser al-Maliki, nephew and son-in-law of the alliance head, along with Turkmen Islamists headed by “Jasim Jaafar.” [20]
The goal of this alliance is to pave the way for al-Maliki’s return to the position of Prime Minister; also, since Sudani emerged from under Dawa’s wing, independence and emergence as a Shiite leader is not in al-Maliki’s interest and is a threat. Al-Maliki is known for strong electoral tactics and having a stable popular base, whose network of beneficiaries, two terms of prime ministership have named; he is also known for choosing strong allies for his list, due to his eight years of experience in the prime ministership.
Asa’ib Movement List (Sadiqun):
The special list of Asa’ib movement headed by its secretary-general, who is “Qais al-Khazali.” This movement basically emerged from within Sadr and is part of the Iranian axis, but in this election it tries to prove its Iraqi identity more. This force in recent years, by utilizing government participation, weapons, participation in the ISIS war, media, and some known figures, has gained some elevation. Apart from Babylon province, they hold the “Ministry of Higher Education” position and have significant position and influence in Sudani’s government. Speakers of this list mention that their separation from Shiite lists and their solo descent is for multiplicity, not fragmentation; otherwise, their goal is common [21].
Apart from the party itself (Asa’ib movement), as an electoral tactic, several tribal components from Salah al-Din province (Tikrit) participate in this list; in this, benefit has been taken from the experience of this session where Asa’ib sent a woman (Nasik al-Zenki) and a Sunni man (Mohammed al-Baldawi) to parliament from that province [22].
Badr List of Hadi al-Ameri:
The list of “Badr Organization” which relies on the network of beneficiaries of this armed organization and the background of its leader, “Hadi al-Ameri,” as a prominent leader of Popular Mobilization and a veteran fighter with position. Al-Ameri initially decided to participate with Sudani, but withdrew [23]. It was also mentioned that the reason was al-Ameri and Sudani’s disagreement over supporting another term of prime ministership for Sudani.
Badr is a prominent military wing within Popular Mobilization, has great dependence on Iran, and has significant presence within the Interior Ministry and state security institutions. For elections, it looks to that official and security base, but this force’s problem is the rise of other competing Shiite military wings, like Asa’ib and other forces of the second and third generation, which were formed after the ISIS war.
Hakim and Abadi Alliance (National State Forces):
This alliance is based on the Hakim-Abadi axis and they introduce themselves as the moderate current among Shiites. In the 2018 elections, their results were very weak, but in the provincial councils (2023) they somewhat balanced and hope was created for them to increase their seats. It is decided that apart from these two, some other forces and personalities will participate in this alliance, especially those close to October and civilian movements [24].
This alliance relies on the symbolic capital of the Hakim family and Abadi’s governance experience and moderate discourse – compared to the hardliners of the “Shiite Framework.” Along with this, it has gathered several candidates and prominent personalities.
Mandalawi Alliance (al-Asas):
This alliance is the political base of the Deputy Parliament Speaker, “Mohsin al-Mandalawi,” and includes a group of new Shiite forces that are at the level of dissatisfied civilian forces and opposition. According to official announcements, the number of entities and participating blocs in this alliance is 22 forces that represent several different areas of Iraq and their slogan is “Correcting the Path of the Political Process” [25]. Among the components of this alliance are entities belonging to “Imam Ali Brigades” called “National Iraq Movement” which is an armed group belonging to Popular Mobilization [26].
Al-Aidani and Fayyad Alliance (Decision):
The alliance is the political base of Basra Governor, “Asaad al-Aidani,” who is a prominent and influential personality in southern Iraq. In this alliance, there are a number of social and economic personalities, and parliamentarian “Amer al-Fayyad” heads the list. Through this alliance, al-Aidani wants to defend his independence within the Shiite space and benefit from his administrative position in the Basra governorship. It is said that his independent participation is an attempt to replace Sudani and self-promotion for the prime minister position with Sadrist support, given that his relationship with them is good [27].
The main slogan of the alliance is “Achieving Basra’s Rights” from the federal government [28]. In recent periods, the mentioned person has entered into some competitions with the central government and Sudani.
Supreme Islamic Council Alliance (Good News for Iraq):
This alliance is headed by “Humam Hamoudi,” head of the Supreme Islamic Council. Its announced formal goal is “Correction for a better future.” It also mentions being against “fragmentation” [29].
The main supporter of this alliance is the Supreme Islamic Council, which after the separation of Badr and the Hikma movement has significantly retreated in the Shiite political map, and its achieved results have decreased to symbolic participation in parliament.
Shiite Alliances in Sunni Provinces:
A number of Shiite Framework lists, to confront the threat of rising Sunni forces, participate with joint lists in the elections of Diyala, Nineveh, and Salah al-Din provinces. Although this step has no legal and constitutional restrictions, it is viewed as a political risk and adventure where Shiite forces display themselves outside their popular base area and have lists and compete with Sunnis; through this they want to invest in the ISIS war and create cracks among Sunni tribes and try to buy their votes. These alliances are “Salah al-Din Alliance,” “Diyala First Alliance,” “al-Hadba” alliance in Mosul. In “Kirkuk” too, there is talk of forming a Shiite front, but its size and form are not yet clear.
Conclusion
In the 2025 elections, Shiites in general and the forces of the “Coordination Framework” will descend in fragmentation, but their decision is to reunite after the process, and their division is more temporary and tactical. Their major challenge is fear of the consequences of Sadr’s boycott and money pumping by Sunni countries for their competing lists. Also, regional changes in the region and Sunni demands to benefit from Syria’s fall have created pressure on them. At the same time, the elections have come forward while the Iranian axis is in weakness. To solve part of these, Shiite forces work on frightening their popular bases for intensive and active participation; also in Sunni provinces they have formed unified lists hoping to create cracks among Sunni components and buy votes and benefit from post-ISIS war changes.
The internal competition of Shiites is over the redistribution of positions and influence and the prime minister position; their main competition arena is the capital Baghdad, especially since many of their leaders descend as number one in this electoral constituency which has nearly 10 million inhabitants and around 70 seats in the future parliament. The battle will be over the number of votes for list head number (1), especially between al-Maliki and Sudani who both emerged from the Dawa Party base, with al-Maliki being the leader and Sudani being an advanced cadre.
* This analysis was originally published in Kurdish by the Kurdistan Think Tank and translated into English for Kfuture Media by Rayan Jamal. For references related to the article, click here.
